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I. INTRODUCTION
Our current age has been described as an "information revolu-
tion": a new era along the continuum of industrial development that
has brought tremendous change and innovation to our planet. Due to
the convergence of the communications and computer industries, in-
formation once exchanged in physical form is now being transmitted
electronically. Examples of electronic information exchange include
access to medical technology, interactive video, immediate banking
and investment services, home shopping, electronic mail, and database
exchange.'
As a result of these technological developments, many countries
are focusing upon the development and upgrade of telecommunica-
tions infrastructure in order to compete economically at the interna-
tional level. In the near future developing countries will spend
billions to improve their communications networks.2 The telecommu-
nications industry therefore offers a highly promising market to for-
eign investors, spurred by both relaxed government regulation and
expanding multinational business opportunities.3
The recently popularized term "information superhighway" refers
to the basic physical infrastructure supporting this movement toward
1. For a detailed discussion of the policies contributing to current telecommunications
development in industrializing countries, see Roy Carleton Howell, International Telecommuni-
cations and the Law: The Creation of Pan African Satellites, 31 How. L.J. 575 (1988).
2. Catherine Arnst et al., The Last Frontier, Bus. WK., Sept. 18, 1995, at 98.
3. Keith E. Bernard, New Global Network Arrangements: Regulatory and Trade Consid-
erations, 18 TEcouMM. POL'Y 378 (1994).
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informational interdependence. The information superhighway in-
cludes, among other technologies, fiber optic cables, high-speed
switching devices, andwireless transmitters (referred to here as "tele-
communications").4 Currently, much debate exists over how to prop-
erly establish, operate, and regulate this telecommunications
infrastructure. Areas of technological development now controlled by
governmental or quasi-administrative agencies are being shifted to-
wards private sector control.' In response to this shift, new ap-
proaches to investment strategies must be examined to determine how
to most effectively enable telecommunications infrastructure develop-
ment and to define government's role in telecommunications develop-
ment and maintenance.
This comment addresses the problems involved in establishing
telecommunications infrastructure in countries historically predis-
posed to governmental control of telecommunications development
and industry. Part II explains traditional forms of infrastructure fi-
nancing and describes current global trends in foreign investment
strategy. Next, part III provides a brief description of the international
telecommunications industry and the various forms of investment fi-
nancing involved therein. Part IV describes and defines innovative
project financing schemes, focusing primarily on a modem contractual
arrangement: the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model, in an attempt
to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of such organizational
models within the telecommunications arena. The final section pro-
vides a discussion of some legal and regulatory issues surrounding the
use of BOT agreements and explains various contractual protections
potential investors and host governments may seek when utilizing
such arrangements.
II. INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN NEwLY-INDUSTRIALIZINr
COUNTmFS6
Infrastructure development traditionally has been facilitated
through the public sector. State governments have generally funded
4. David Bank, Foundation for an Information Age, SAN JosE MERCuRY NEws, Dec. 5,
1994, at ID.
5. "[U]ser demand for services is driving telecoms infrastructure development globally,
widening the possibilities for investment strategies as government monopolies realize they are ill
equipped financially to meet consumer needs." Luke Hill, User Demand Widens Telecoms Pros-
pects, UPI, Sept. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, UPI File.
6. For the sake of convenience the term "newly-industrializing countries" will be used
throughout this paper. It is intended to include nations that in the past have been referred to as
"developing" or "Third World" countries; however, many of the assertions and generalizations
set forth in this paper may reflect problems and solutions that can also be applied to nations
commonly considered to be "industrialized" or "First-World" nations.
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and controlled the construction, maintenance, and operation of nearly
all public services, including communications.7 Examples of primary
forms of public sector financing include direct government expendi-
ture of appropriated funds,8 general-obligation bonds,9 subsidiza-
tion, 10 and concessions to state-owned enterprises. 1 These methods
may have certain limitations however. Bonds require public approval,
while revenue and debt limits may inhibit infrastructure investment by
government agencies. 2  Economic deficiencies and poor financial
management of resources have further depleted internal funding in
many newly-industrializing countries (NICs), 13 causing many to seek
foreign capital as a primary source of funding for infrastructure devel-
opment. Traditional modes of such foreign investment into NICs may
generally be distinguished as either debt financing or foreign direct
investment.
A. Public Sector Debt Financing
1. The World Bank
A common channel of debt financing NICs access to facilitate
infrastructure building has been the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, or more commonly, the World Bank. The
World Bank is an international financial institution whose purposes
involve assisting in the development of its member state's territories,
promoting and supplementing private foreign investment, and facili-
tating long-term growth in international trade. 4 To meet these goals,
the Bank is empowered to: lend directly to member states and busi-
7. Daud Beg, Private Power Generation Initiatives in Pakistan, ECON. REv., Aug. 1994,
at 39.
8. See Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U.L. Rv.
531, 621 (1989).
9. ld.
10. See Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN.
L. Rnv. 1103 (1987); David A. Codevilla, Comment: Discouraging the Practice of What We
Preach: Saarstahl I, Inland Steel and the Implementation of the Uruguay Round of GA7T 1994,
3 GEo. MASON. IND. L. REv. 435 (1995).
11. Philippe Lietard & Everett J. Santos, On the Move; Privatization of Infrastructure
Services; Privatization in Latin America 1994, LATINFINANCE, Mar., 1994, § 55, at S4, available
in LEXIS, ALLNEWS Library, ASAPII File.
12. Robbins, supra note 8, at 623.
13. For a detailed discussion of the economic factors contributing to the Third World Debt
Crisis, see Lee C. Buchheit, Alternative Techniques in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 1988 U.
Ii.. L. REv. 371 (1988). See also Alfred J. Puchala, Jr., Securitizing Third World Debt, 1989
COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 137 (1989); Rory MacMillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 305, 311-13 (1989).
14. Articles of Agreement Between the United States of America and Other Powers Re-
specting the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 27, 1945, art. I(i)-
(iii), 60 Stat. 1440, [hereinafter Articles of Agreement].
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nesses located within the borders of its member states;'" guarantee
loans dispersed through private investment routes; 6 issue, guarantee,
and acquire its own individual securities; and acquire and guarantee
the securities of other parties.' 7
Qualifying for loans or technical assistance from the World Bank
requires a country to conform its economic policies to standards that
promote efficient economic development.' Often, convincing the
World Bank to lend depends upon a nation effectively aligning its
stated goals with values recognized by the Bank, Le., "privatization,
the elimination of domestic subsidies, balanced budgets and vigilance
against inflation, [and] policies that reflect capitalist models of devel-
opment and benefit first-world investors."' 9 In addition, despite rheto-
ric within the Bank's Articles of Agreement instituting a policy of
non-interference in member states' political affairs,2" the Bank has
been able to completely rearrange the constitutional framework of bor-
rowing nations by exploiting its financial leverage and imposing re-
strictive conditions on its loans.2' As a result, some NICs are
becoming disillusioned by such subjective standards and are seeking
alternative forms of investment capital to fund infrastructure
projects.22
2. Multilateral and Bilateral Assistance Organizations
Other means of debt financing include regional multilateral fi-
nancial institutions or regional banks, such as, the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank and the Asian Development Bank.23 In the past,
development banks have facilitated economic development primarily
by lending funds to industrial pursuits within the public sectors of
15. Id. art. m, § 4, 60 Stat. 1444.
16. Id. art. IV, § 1, 60 Stat. 1445.
17. Id § 8, 60 Stat. 1449.
18. PAUL B. STEPHAN III ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS: LAW AND
POLICY 52 (1993).
19. Id.
20. Articles of Agreement, supra note 14, art. I, § 10 ("The Bank and its officers shall not
interfere in the political affairs of any member.").
21. Jonathan Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The World Bank and the
Democratization of Development, 6 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 159, 160 (1993).
22. For a comprehensive explanation of the World Bank's increasing role in NIC govern-
ance, see id.
23. Dante B. Fascell & Virginia M. Schlundt, Perspective: United States International
Communications and Information Policy: A Crisis in the Making?, 5 J. INT'L L. Bus. 486, 501-
502 (1983). For a more detailed discussion of the roles of multilateral financial institutions, in
particular the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which includes examples of particular
funding programs and methods available, see Alain Soulard, The Role of Multilateral Financial
Institutions in Bringing Developing Companies to U.S. Markets, 17 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. S145
(1994).
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NICs.2 4 Such lending is usually facilitated through mutual financing
arrangements involving more than one lender and requires such insti-
tutions to either fund directly to the public sector of NICs or to invest
in private sector project financing arrangements along with other pri-
vate sector investors.25 These aid programs have proven effective to a
large extent. However, lack of effective planning procedures and dis-
organization have led to duplication in funding and unreliability.26
Many within the global economic community are also beginning to
acknowledge the limited nature of such multilateral pools of invest-
ment funding,27 and the fact that this limited pool of funding is also
causing internal structural change within multilateral development
banks. In response to the recent global debt crisis,28 international
commercial banks have become more selective in their lending deter-
minations and wary of long-term lending.29 This is evidenced by the
massive rise in private sector lending in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe
and Latin America,30 and increasing frequency of lending against the
prospects of particular projects, rather than against the credit of gov-
ernmental sponsors.3
Additional sources of infrastructure funding have come from bi-
lateral assistance organizations. In efforts to assist NICs to achieve
parity within the international community, the United States, for ex-
ample, has established bilateral development assistance programs
through the Agency for International Development (AID). 32 Full re-
payment of development loans to NICs can be guaranteed by AID and
are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States.33 Develop-
24. New Report Shows Private Sector & Industry Now Dominates Development Bank
Lending, PR Newswire, Apr. 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library, ALLNWS File
[hereinafter New Report].
25. Manfred Ernst & Naja Ngoc-Nga Pham, Financing Infrastructure in Developing Econ-
onies: Benefits, Risks Sources, E. AsiAN Exacur tr REP., Mar. 15, 1994, at 7, available in
LEXIS, BUSFIN Library, ALLNWS File.
26. Fascell & Schlundt, supra note 23, at 500, 502.
27. Asia Needs $1.0 Trillion for Infrastructure - ADB, Reuters Newswire, July 27, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BUSFIN File.
28. See generally Buchheit, supra note 13.
29. Victor Traverso, The Rules of the Game; Project Finance Challenges in Latin
America;, Project Finance in Latin America, LATNFNANCE, June 1994, at S4.
30. New Report, supra note 24.
31. lId (Recent financing of BOO/BOT projects in Asia and Latin America have reached
$2.2 billion, while those in Eastern Europe and Africa have received $45 billion in private sector
loans.). See also infra text accompanying note 47.
32. Act for International Development of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 621 (current version
at 22 U.S.C. § 2381 (1988)).
33. Id. § 222 (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 2182 (1988)).
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ment aid sponsored by AID also may take the form of grants to for-
eign governmental agencies.34
Despite the utility of the AID program, the constitutional man-
date found within the enabling legislation for AID also limits its effec-
tiveness. AID's fundamental purpose has been redesigned to address
basic human needs.3" Financial assistance has been denied in the past
for infrastructure projects, such as, roads and communications facili-
ties on the grounds that such projects are not considered of primary
necessity or "basic human needs."36 The AID program also may suf-
fer from the structural and ideological biases common to the World
Bank and other multilateral and regional financial institutions as as-
serted above.37 Currently, it is the intention that "[a]ssistance from the
United States shall be used in support of, rather than substitution for,
the self-help efforts that are essential to successful development pro-
grams."'38 Further, as modem infrastructure projects have become in-
creasingly sophisticated and dependent upon high technology, the role
of AID has changed.
[When selecting] [b]ilateral development aid [programs, the Execu-
tive Branch] should concentrate increasingly on sharing American
technical expertise... and industrial goods to meet critical devel-
opment problems, and less on large-scale capital transfers, which
when made should be in association with contributions from other
34. As an example from the field of telecommunications, in Egypt a fairly representative
low-to-middle income developing country with regard to the status of its industry, a 500,000-line
fiber optic network expansion is being financed by AID through the use of a $200 million grant.
Toby Ash et al., Gearing Up for a Great Leap Forward, Middle East Communications Industry,
MEED Special Report: Telecoms Industry Overview, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Apr. 10 1995, at
13, available in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library, ALLNWS File.
35. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189 § 2 (1973) (codified as amended
at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1988)).
36. Fascell & Schlundt, supra note 23, at 500-501.
37. AID's asserted six basic principles are:
* Support for free markets and broadbased economic growth;
* Concern for individuals and the development of their economic and social well-
being;
" Support for democracy;
" Encouragement of responsible environmental policies and prudent management
of natural resources;
* Support for lasting solutions to transnational problems; and,
* Provision of humanitarian assistance to those who suffer from natural or man-
made disasters.
Overview of Foreign Assistance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Pol-
icy, Trade, Oceans, and Environment; African Affairs and East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1991) (statement of Ronald W.
Roskens, Administrator, AID).
38. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-424,
(1978) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151-1).
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industrialized countries working together in a multilateral
framework. 39
Multilateral debt financing may also be inadequate to effectively
manage the risks created with financing large infrastructure projects.
Funding from international sources has traditionally involved loan
agreements dependent upon payments denominated in foreign cur-
rency. 4' However, infrastructure projects usually rely upon revenues
from domestic consumers payable in local currency to service debt.41
Thus, if exchange rates fluctuate, infrastructure projects financed with
such intemational loans are directly affected.42
Although the World Bank and other types of non-equity financ-
ing have provided somewhat reliable sources of funding in the past,
these economic and ideological factors are causing many NICs to seek
primary investment from alternative channels.
B. Privatization and Foreign Investment
Recent trends suggest that public sector control over infrastruc-
ture development and operation has been inefficient, in addition to
being somewhat impractical.43 State control of facilities may impair
commercial objectives, such as, independent management, profit en-
hancement, and the establishment of cross-holdings and may be inhib-
ited by public accounting procedures." Many countries simply do not
have the available finances to afford capital-intensive industrialization,
even with the assistance of multilateral financing efforts.45 Further,
international financial institutions are restructuring lending policies in
attempts to encourage greater private involvement and the commer-
cialization of utilities operators in the area of infrastructure
development.46
39. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189, § 2 (current version codified at
22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1988)).
40. Lietard & Santos, supra note 11.
41. Id.
42. Id
43. Id See generally, Jonathan C. Carlson, A Missing Link in the International Debt Strat.
egy: Trade Policy Reform in Industrial Nations, 32 How. L.J. 771 (1989).
44. Daniel Hurstel & Mary Ann Carpenter-Pecquet, Privatization and the Public Interest,
13 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 34 (1994), available in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library, ALLNWS File.
45. See generally, Andrew D. Cao, Infrastructure Financing Methods: Paving the Way for
Privatization in Latin America, LATINFINANCE, Jan. 1993, available in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library,
ALLNWS File.
46. See Michael T. Burr, Institutional Restructuring, INDEPENDENT ENaEoy, July/Aug.
1995, at 8, available in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library, ALLNWS File (describing restructured policy
and new role of the World Bank); see also Calm, supra note 21, at 162 n.149 (describing World
Bank's differentiation between project and program lending).
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When focusing on industries involving high-technology (i.e.,
telecommunications, power utilities, sanitation facilities, etc.), the de-
ficiencies of the public sector become magnified. "Past examples
have demonstrated that the public sector seems ill-suited to effective
and efficient management of infrastructure assets while private inves-
tors perform substantially better than the state in terms of investment,
capacity expansion, service delivery and efficiency."'47 The argument
in favor of privatization weighs heavily in industries such as telecom-
munications where these factors are essential and the necessity to keep
pace with technological development is high.4"
1. Private Sector Participation
NICs are thus becoming increasingly reliant upon the private sec-
tor to provide the requisite financing for the development of crucial
infrastructure.4 9 These developing countries are also increasingly al-
lowing private entities to exhibit greater control over their foreign in-
vestments. Most recent growth in private sector financing has come in
the form of direct foreign investment.5" Direct foreign investment in-
volves investment whereby a private company acquires or establishes
a "lasting business interest" in a newly-industrializing country."
Many private companies favor such direct investment, in contrast to
investment through the acquisition of foreign stock or other portfolio
securities, as it enables greater control over the management of a for-
eign enterprise. 2 Such investment also benefits NICs by providing
needed investment capital and technological support.53
In the area of infrastructure development, direct investment may
be particularly effective. Some commentators argue that such direct
investment is better suited to the kind of structured financing com-
monly required for infrastructure projects since "[t]he typical infra-
47. Lietard & Santos, supra note 11.
48. Alan Spence & Jon Marks, FT Exporter, FIN. Tiwms, Oct. 5, 1994, at 4, available in
LEXIS, BUSFIN Library, ALLNWS File.
49. The various techniques used in privatization programs include, among others: joint
venture, management contract or lease, liquidation, and concession or build-operate-transfer.
Matthew L. Hensley & Edward P. white, The Privatization Experience in Malaysia: Integrating
Build-Operate-Own and Build-Operate-Transfer Techniques Within the National Privatization
Strategy, 28 COLum. J. WoRVaD Bus. 70 (1993), available in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library,
ALLNWS File.
50. Lietard & Santos, supra note 11.
51. Patricia McKinstry Robin, The Bit Won't Bite: The American Bilateral Investment
Treaty Program, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 931 (1984). Portfolio finance, in the form of debentures,
bonds, or listed shares and private placements, is distinct from foreign direct investment. Lietard
& Santos, supra note 11.
52. Robin, supra note 51, at 931.
53. Id.
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structure project is large, has no operating track record, has a long
construction period during which debt cannot be serviced, and in-
volves risks that are not often addressed by the portfolio investor."54
Probably the most popular recent form of direct foreign involve-
ment is the joint venture. A joint venture has been defined as:
an integration of operations between two or more separate firms
[where] (1) the enterprise is under the joint control of the parent
firms, which are not under related control; (2) each parent makes a
substantial contribution to the joint enterprise; (3) the enterprise ex-
ists as a business entity separate from its parents; and (4) the joint
venture creates significant new enterprise capability in terms of
new productive capacity, new technology, a new product, or entry
into a new market.55
By forming a partnership with foreign businesses, companies can
enter the economies of NICs with the advantages of participating with
local knowledge and experience.56  Indeed, many developing coun-
tries insist upon local involvement as a condition upon foreign en-
trance into the marketplace.57
The most grandiose method governments have chosen to attract
foreign investment into the public sector is direct and total privatiza-
tion of state-owned enterprises. 8 "Privatizations [of public infrastruc-
ture projects] transfer the ownership of existing assets, or rights to
those assets, from the state to a foreign or domestic private entity that
will assume the duties and operation of the property. 59 Common fac-
tors influencing governments to adopt privatization programs include
54. Lietard & Santos, supra note 11.
55. Joseph F. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1523, 1526
(1982).
56. Keith R. Evans, Joint Ventures within ASEAN, in MaEIALS ON ASEAN, INDUSTRIA.
INVESTMENT IN ASEAN, AND US/ASEAN TRADE RELATIONS 95, 97 (Phiroze K. Irani ed., Singa-
pore Summer Law Program, at 96, University of Santa Clara School of Law, June 1994) [herein-
after Evans in Irani].
57. U.S. International Trade Commission, Pub. No. 2820, Industry and Trade Summary 88
(1994), 1994 ITC LEXIS 568, at *1 [hereinafter USITC 1994].
58. Cao, supra note 45.
In 1988, the total proceeds of privatized [state-owned enterprises] worldwide
were approximately $19.5 billion according to Privatization International. This
figure rose to $24.7 billion in 1989 and to $25.3 billion in 1990. With the aboli-
tion of centrally-planned economic systems in Eastern Europe and the former So-
viet Union, privatization has become an even more important development
strategy in the overall economic restructuring and liberalization of world markets.
As evidence, total privatization proceeds in 1991 reached $53.2 billion, an in-
crease of 110% over the previous year.
Id.
59. Ernst & Pham, supra note 25.
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increasing operational efficiency, utilizing external funding and com-
mercial expertise, and accessing new sources of technology. 60
2. Incremental Privatization and Concessions to Private
Industry
Complete and unilateral privatization of an industry requires
great confidence and commitment to political liberalism as the loss of
control and displacement of labor virtually assures local opposition.
Many NICs are unwilling to relinquish dominion over strategic eco-
nomic industries, such as, telecommunications and power generation,
since such industries are both an important source of economic reve-
nue, as well as an integral component of the effective operation of
government. 61 It also has been asserted that private sector concern
with the "bottom-line" precludes it from recognizing the social func-
tion common to many utilities.62 Furthermore, it can be argued that
the goals of increased efficiency and greater access to private capital
and technology can be achieved through less extreme methods.
The political complexities arising from entire privatization of an
existing public sector enterprise have led some governments to select
the alternative strategy of allowing short-term private sector penetra-
tion into particular activities or niche markets prior to unilateral priva-
tization.63 This incremental approach allows private participants to be
introduced into an industrial sector without the need to establish a
completely new regulatory foundation.6l Although uncertainties
about the future regulatory environment of a host government may
remain, the risks facing potential private investors can usually be miti-
gated through long-term contracts between participants (e.g., equity
investor(s), host government, contractors and lenders), 65 or, in the al-
ternative, though legislation directed solely toward such incremental
privatization attempts.66
Such short-term private investments have been facilitated primar-
ily through the use of concession agreements. "A concession agree-
ment [is] defined as a license granted by a sovereign government to a
foreign corporation or business for the express purpose of exploiting a
natural resource, developing a geographic area, or pursuing some par-
ticular venture, for which the government desires the corporation's ex-
60. Hensley & White, supra note 49.
61. Cao, supra note 45.
62. Burr, supra note 46,
63. Lietard & Santos, supra note 11.
64. Il
65. Id.
66. See infra part V.B.1.
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pertise, assets, technology, or capital."'67 In a usual concession
arrangement, responsibility for the management and operation of pub-
lic sector services and/or facilities is privatized, while the state retains
ownership interest in company assets.68 These agreements may be
useful in achieving economic development in fields where a host gov-
ernment is unwilling to surrender its rights of ownership.69 Such un-
willingness often arises because a host government perceives a threat
to national sovereignty, such as increased concentration of economic
power in foreign businesses70 or the displacement of labor.7
Concession arrangements provide the state with an effective tool
to defend and protect the public interest as "the state retains [ultimate]
control over the conditions under which management is conducted.172
Such public interest concerns include continuity of provision, rate
control and adequate and impartial service. 73 Thus, concession agree-
ments enable collaboration of the state, as protector of the public inter-
est, and private industry, who can contribute business acumen74 and
economic capability.
C. Project Finance
Project financing based upon nonrecourse lending is a mecha-
nism for attracting private capital that may correspond with a national
policy of staged privatization or concessionary licensing.
The term "project finance" . . is generally used to refer to the
arrangement of debt, equity, and credit enhancement for the con-
struction or refinancing of a particular facility in a capital-intensive
industry, in which lenders base credit appraisals on the projected
revenues from the operation of the facility... and in which they
rely on the assets of the facility, including the revenue-producing
contracts and cash flow, as collateral for the debt.75
In less complicated terms, project financing is lending based "on
the merits of a project rather than the credit of the project sponsor. "76
67. Viktor Soloveytchik, New Perspectives for Concession Agreements: A Comparison of
Hungarian Law and the Draft Laws ofBelarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L.
261, 263 n.1 (1993).
68. Hurstel & Carpenter-Pecquet, supra note 44.
69. Soloveytchik, supra note 67, at 271.
70. Id at 271-72.
71. Cao, supra note 45.
72. Hurstel & Carpenter-Pecquet, supra note 44.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Scott L. Hoffman, A Practical Guide to Transactional Project Finance: Basic Con-
cepts, Risk Identification, and Contractual Considerations, 45 Bus. LAW. 181 n.1 (1989).
76. Id. at 183.
[Vol. 12
PROJECT FINANCE
The nonrecourse nature of the debt relieves a project sponsor from
liability to repay project debt or make interest payments on principal
in the event that revenue generated by the project turns out to be insuf-
ficient to service debt obligations.77 Credit assessments by lenders are
instead predicated upon the potential underlying cash flow from reve-
nue generation pursuant to project operation.7"
In the area of public sector infrastructure development, the use of
project finance can be advantageous to both host governments and
private investors. Primarily, it enables host governments to attract pri-
vate capital investment without guaranteeing payment of project costs
and without completely rearranging its economic markets through di-
rect privatization.7 9 Lenders may be more willing to lend on such a
"project-specific" basis in situations where a developing country
would present an otherwise unfavorable credit risk due to political un-
rest or other noneconomic factors .
0
Project financing methods provide investors with an alternative
to internal, or equity, financing.81 Additional objectives in pursuing
project finance may include:
(i) elimination of, or limitation on, the recourse nature of the fi-
nancing of a project, (ii) off-balance-sheet treatment of debt financ-
ing, (iii) leverage of debt to avoid dilution of existing equity, (iv)
avoidance of restrictive covenants in other debt or equity arrange-
ments that would otherwise preclude project development, and (v)
arrangement of attractive debt financing and credit enhancement,
available to the project itself, but which is unavailable to the project
sponsor as a direct loan.
82
It is in contrast to term lending, in which lenders analyze the loan based on histor-
ical earnings of the borrower and are satisfied with recourse to the collateral value
of the borrower's assets securing the loan to ensure debt repayment. Other distin-
guishing factors... include the high leverage of project finance debt, reliance on
commitments by third parties for debt repayment in specified contingencies, and
nonrecourse treatment of the project finance debt.
Id. at 181.
77. Id at 183.
78. Id at 182.
79. Furthermore, the nonrecourse or limited recourse nature of the financing also enables
private investors to refrain from providing financial guarantees as well. See infra part II.
80. Pakistan: Trade and Project Funds Flowing, Political Doubts Persist, IWr'L TRADE
FIN., Mar. 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library, ALLNWS File.
81. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 182 n.4 ("Mnternal financing [,as distinguished from pro-
ject financing, occurs where a] corporate sponsor uses retained earnings or short-term debt to
finance the development and construction of a facility until the project requires permanent fi-
nancing, which may be financed with long-term debt, equity sales, or other corporate finance
techniques.").
82. Ua at 185.
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Such project financings may also afford foreign investors with the op-
portunity to directly participate in an otherwise inaccessible and un-
predictable market.83
While the varieties of infrastructure project financing are diverse,
two popular arrangements utilized by NICs have been the Build-Oper-
ate-Transfer (BOT) and the Build-Own-Operate (BOO) models.8 4
Project financing under the BOT85 model is used for new construction
projects where a sponsoring foreign investor or consortium of lenders
and/or investors supervises the construction and operations of a pro-
ject facility for a determinate duration, and subsequently transfers
ownership and control of the project "back to the host government at
some future date."86
By contrast, under the BOO method, a sponsor or sponsoring
consortium controls the construction and operation of the particular
project as owners, without a subsequent transfer of project assets to a
host government. 87 The feasibility of a BOO project financing will be
determined by its internal rate of return. Since there is no subsequent
transfer of project assets, "the transfer value (or "terminal value") be-
longs to the sponsor and is included in the calculation of the target
[internal rate of return]."88 Primary rationales for a host government
not to insist upon subsequent reversion of ownership would be the
lack of political pressure to own or control the facilities, or true com-
mitment to total private sector development and unilateral liberaliza-
tion of industry.89
83. See Alexa C. Lam, Infrastructure Investment Tips, CHINA Bus. REv., Sept. 1994, at 44,
available in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library, ALLNWS File. See also infra text accompanying note
155.
84. Cao, supra note 45. Other methods have included Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO),
Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT), Refurbish-Operate-Lease and other derivative models. Ernst &
Pham, supra note 25. The model used will depend on both the existence of governmental restric-
tions on industry and how participating parties choose to allocate the project risks. The BTO
model, for example, may be used where government ownership of a project is necessary for
some reason. IM. In a BLT, however, construction risks are borne wholly by the private sector.
It instead owns the project during the concession period, and leases it to the government for
operation with lease payments designed "to amortize debt and provide a fixed return" on equity.
Id.
85. The term "Build-Operate-Transfer" is sometimes used interchangeably with the term
"Build-Own-Operate-Transfer" or BOOT. It has been asserted that it is actually the latter defini-
tion which more accurately describes the nature of such a project financing arrangement. Cao,
supra note 45. However, for convenience, the term BOT will be used throughout this article.
86. Id. See infra part VL
87. Cao, supra note 45.
88. Id.
89. Id. For more discussion of such political pressure against total privatization within the
telecommunications industry, see infra parts IIt IV.
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Traditional dependencies upon international financial institutions
and other forms of public sector debt financing are, therefore, being
replaced by a greater openness to the use of direct foreign investment
and alternative methods of private financing. Hence, the relevant
question to ask when considering development of crucial infrastruc-
ture becomes: which financial and corporate arrangements are best
suited for certain projects in light of both the particularities of a given
industry, as well as the requirements of a host nation?
I. TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
Determining adequate and effective methods of infrastructure de-
velopment for industrializing nations will often depend upon the na-
ture of the services that are sought to be provided. Therefore, in
focusing on telecommunications development, the pervading nature of
the industry becomes highly relevant.
Telecommunications are defined in the International Telecommu-
nication Convention as "[a]ny transmission, emission or reception of
signs, signals, writing, images and sounds or intelligence of any nature
by wires, radio, optical or other electromagnetic systems."90 This
transmission occurs by means of carriers, such as, broadcast or direct
line. Carriers are coupled with satellite relays and switching devices,
which allow such transmission systems to operate, and with terminals,
which transmit and receive information.91 The communication net-
work provides a set of infrastructures, composed of such switching
facilities and transmission lines, which provide the means of transmit-
ting and routing telecommunication signals.9 2 These infrastructure
facilities:
transmit, receive, or carry data between the telecommunications
terminal equipment at each end of a telecommunications circuit or
path. Such facilities include microwave antennae, relay stations
and towers, other telecommunications antennae, fiber-optic cables
and repeaters, coaxial cables, communication satellite ground sta-
tion complexes, [and] copper cable electronic equipment associated
with telecommunication transmissions 93
90. International Telecommunication Convention, Malaga-Torremolinos, done Oct. 25,
1973, 28 U.S.T. 2495, 2644.
91. SE'PHAN Er Ai., supra note 18,'at 785.
92. OECD WORKING PARTY ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SERVICES POLI-
cIEs, TRADE IN TELECOMMUNICATION NErWORK-BASED SERVICES: ACCESS TO AND USE OF PUB-
LIC TELECOMMUNICATION NETwoRKS (1990), partially reprinted in STEPHAN ET AL., supra note
18, at 786-87 [hereinafter OECD in STEPHAN Er AL.].
93. 7 U.S.C.A. § 950aaa-2(9) (West Supp. 1995).
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Internationally, this infrastructure is primarily owned and operated by
public telecommunication operators, often on the basis of state-sanc-
tioned monopolies.94
A. Past Development of the Telecommunications Industry
Control over the supply of telecommunications services has been
historically viewed as properly residing within the public sector. Tele-
communications infrastructure development was seen as restrictive to
competition due to the huge capital investment outlays involved.95
Additional political concerns over the provision of telecommunica-
tions services have included ensuring consistent and impartial service,
maintaining low local rates, preventing duplicative investment, devel-
oping uniform equipment and transmitting standards, and advancing
domestic commercial growth. 96 Considerations of national security
and limiting access to pornography have also been asserted by some
countries as justifications of such governmental control of the indus-
try. 97 Further, since the construction of carriers requires the allocation
of certain limited resources (e.g., property easements for lines, fre-
quency bandwidth for broadcast), in instances where governments did
not own carriers outright, administrations still have imposed condi-
tions upon its development.98
As a result of these factors, "governments [have] either tolerated
monopoly carriers, regulated them, or owned them outright."99 In the
United States, for example, the Government has considered the provi-
sion of telecommunications services to be a "natural monopoly" in the
past. The Government acquiesced to American Telephone and Tele-
graph's (AT&T) role as the monopolistic supplier of a variety of com-
munications services and equipment throughout the. early stages of
telecommunications development.100 The intention was to ensure that
94. OECD in STEPtAN Er AL., supra note 92.
95. STPHAN Er AL., supra note 18, at 791.
96. Douglas W. Colber, Comment: Reform of Japanese Telecommunications Law: Pan-
acea or Placebo?, 8 N.W. J. IrNr'L L. & Bus. 145, 149 (1987).
97. Kristin Huckshorn, Vietnam's Net Offensive, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 26,
1995, at IA, 5A.
98. STEPHAN Er AL., supra note 18, at 793. Broadcast media may be regulated by the
federal government due to the scarcity of available broadcast bandwidth. Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). STEPHAN Er AL., supra note 18, n.100.
99. STEPHAN Er AL., supra note 18, at 791.
100. GLoEAL CoMPErTvENEass OF U.S. ADVANCED-TECHNOLOGY MANUFACTURING INDUS-
TRIES: COMMUNICAnIONs TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT: A SUMMARY OF THE REPORT TO THE
COMMrrTEE ON FINANCE, 1991 ITC LEXIS, at *16 [hereinafter USITC 1991 SUMMARY]. This
arrangement was formalized recognized in the case United States v. Western Elec. Co., Inc.,
1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) %a 68,246 (Jan. 24, 1956). The AT&T monopoly lasted until the Modi-
fied Final Judgment of 1982 disassembled it into seven regional holding companies for twenty-
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"communications service was provided to the public on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis and at reasonable prices." '
Until recently, the large majority of foreign administrations relied
on state ownership or direct governmental control as a means to de-
velop their domestic telecommunications industries.' 02 These foreign
enterprises were usually run as state monopolies and were "referred to
as administration[s] of posts, telegraphs and telephones (PTTs)."' 3
This reliance upon public sector control of the industry has subse-
quently affected the manner of financing telecommunications develop-
ment. "When telephone operators were state-owned organisations
operating under ministerial control, financing for telecommunications
development was provided directly from state budgets."'0 4 Technol-
ogy maintenance was achieved primarily through research and devel-
opment collaboration and state-subsidization, 0 5 and traditional
sources of public sector debt financing were relied on for additional
infrastructure funding." 6
B. Private Sector Penetration into the Telecommunications
Arena
Recent industry trends indicate that developed and developing
countries alike are recognizing the importance of private investment to
telecommunications development.' 07 While state budget deficits are
an integral consideration in determining whether to privatize public
sector enterprise, 0 8 the proliferation of trade alliances has also created
two local monopoly local service providers in the case United States v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
101. US1TC 1991 SummARY, supra note 100, at *20-21. Such governmental policies justi-
fying monopolization of telecommunications are common to most nations, for example Japan.
See Colber, supra note 96, at 149.
102. Stuart Z. Chiron & Lise A. Rehberg, Fostering Competition in International Telecom-
munications, 38 FED. CoM. L.J. 1, at 3 n.8 (1986).
103. Id. "Essentially, PTrs are structured in one of three ways: 1. Government administra-
tions or ministries directly operating the networks; 2. Public corporations under the authority of a
government department; or 3. Operation by a private corporation, controlled and/or partially
owned by the government." Id. at 6 n.20.
104. Mark Newman, Survey ofInternational Telecommunications, FIN. TIMrs 15, Oct. 18,
1993, available in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library, ALLNWS File.
105. Desmond Bell, The Corporate State and Broadcasting in Ireland: A National-Popular
Program, 11 CARDozo ARTs & Err. L.J. 337, 342 (1993).
106. Such financing has generally been considered supplemental by the world banking com-
munity as telecommunications investment, historically, has not been viewed as necessary to eco-
nomic development. Fascell & Schlundt, supra note 23, at 504.
107. Larry Irving et al., Steps Toward a Global Information Infrastructure, 39 FED. COM. L.
J. 271, 274 (1994).
108. Andrew Adonis, Survey of International Telecommunications, FIN. TiMFs, Oct. -18,
1993, at 5, available in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library, ALLNWS File.
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multilateral pressure to liberalize telecommunications industries.t°9 In
addition, the general global movement away from state-operated infra-
structure development has also influenced NICs to liberalize their tele-
communications facilities.1 0
Recent technological advances and new market opportunities
have compelled deregulation and competition within the telecommuni-
cations industry."' New technologies, such as, cellular, cable, and
mobile communications, compete directly with existing and dominant
wireline telephone networks. 1 2 The growth of new specialized ser-
vice provider industries has increased demand for fiber optic transmis-
sion systems and other infrastructure equipment outside the scope of
traditional telecommunications suppliers." 3  Such technological ad-
vances have also relieved the resource scarcity concern previously
used to justify natural monopolies. 1 4  Modernization and expansion
are also motivating countries to open their telecommunications mar-
kets to foreign entities, 1 5 as many NICs recognize that network up-
grades will not only require massive infusions of foreign capital
investment, but access to skills and technologies as well." 6 Finally,
while standardization was previously viewed as an essential compo-
109. For an explanation of such multilateral pressure to liberalize national telecommunica-
tions industry within the European Union, see Fernando Pombo, European Community Telecom.
munications Law and Investment Perspectives, 18 FoRDHAM ITrr'L LJ. 555 (1994).
110. As acceptance of private sector penetration into areas traditionally administered by
government slowly progresses, many NICs are beginning to recognize the benefits of competi-
tion within the telecommunications industry as well. Adonis, supra note 108.
111. STEPHAN Er AL., supra note 18, at 792. For example, in privatizing Nippon Telegraph
and Telephone Public Corporation (NTI), the president of NT1 determined that "preserving the
NT" monopoly wasted national resources and impeded the potential of Japan's telecommunica-
tions industry" by limiting access to new technology and products. Colber, supra note 96, at 161.
112. USITC 1991 SUMMARY, supra note 100, at *13-14. In NICs,
the licensing of cellular [concessions] often occurs before privatizing the govern-
ment-run [PTs], since cellular communication is generally seen as a luxury ser-
vice and not in direct competition with [PTrs] .... By inviting outside private
investment, governments are able to spur added growth, technology, infrastruc-
ture, and competition, and to increase overall revenues.
Lisa Sedelnick, On the right track; Latin America's telecommunication industry, LAriNFINANCE,
December 1994, at 18, available in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library, ALLNWS File.
113. Such modernized systems are generally referred to as "integrated services digital net-
works" or "ISDNs." The Federal Communications Commission has defined ISDN as "a network
which is designed and constructed to provide a wide range of telecommunications and informa-
tion services and to transport electrical signals in digital, rather than analog form." Integrated
Services Digital Networks (ISDN), 94 F.C.C.2d 1289 (1983).
114. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Managing Monopolies: The Role of the State in Controlling
Market Dominance in the European Community, 14 EUR. COMPETMON L. REv. 61, 67-68
(1993).
115. For a helpful composite chart on the projected telecommunications investment require-
ments of various nations through the year 2000, see Amst et al., supra note 2.
116. Arnst et al., supra note 2. See also supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
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nent to the interoperability between segments of national network in-
frastructures, interface technology can now interconnect incompatible
systems, effectively extinguishing another role governments formerly
played in operating telecommunications infrastructure.117
With regard to technology maintenance, traditional procurement
methods are becoming irrelevant. In the past, government-owned and
government-controlled telecommunications enterprises "promote[d]
technological advances in the local private communications equipment
industry by preferential procurement policies and research and devel-
opment collaboration.""'  Under such procurement policies, PTTs
often pursued political or social agendas, rather than sound economic
considerations, in accommodating domestic suppliers.I 9 The unfortu-
nate result of such methods is limited access to alternative forms of
technology. Further, these traditional methods of technology adoption
may soon be subjected to antitrust liability or other heightened scru-
tiny standards based on the course of international legal precedent re-
garding privatization and liberalization policies.120
In response to these global economic trends within the interna-
tional telecommunications community, the use of joint ventures and
other forms of business alliances has escalated as a means of entering
foreign markets.' 2 ' Foreign companies, such as, Ericsson, Siemens,
and AT&T, have recently established telecommunications joint ven-
tures with local partners in order to access a variety of developing
markets.22 Local telecommunications authorities in Central Europe
and the former Soviet Union are currently structuring joint venture
arrangements with western companies as a method to upgrade existing
117. Cf Colber, supra note 96, at 162-63.
118. USITC 1991 SuMMARY, supra note 100, at *27.
For example, France Telecom's research arm, CNEr, both provides technical
assistance and expertise to the communications provider and other French minis-
tries, and does substantial cooperative research with French manufacturers of
equipment. Similarly, NTT has traditionally worked extensively with major Japa-
nese manufacturers to develop new projects or technology and has turned over or
licensed results of its own development efforts to companies like NEC, Fujitsu,
Hitachi, and OKI.
l
119. Id at *36-37.
120. At the present time, the most that can be said regarding the future of government
subsidization of technology development is that it is indeterminate, at least until the resolutions
arising from the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations become institutionalized. STEPAN Er
AL., supra note 18, at 30-31. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, version of 15 Dec. 1993, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods [hereinafter Uruguay
Round], Part II, Annex IC, Part II, § 8, published by Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.
121. USITC 1991 SUMMARY, supra note 100, at *6.
122. USITC 1994, supra note 57, at *46.
19961
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
wireline systems. 123 In such joint ventures, local entities usually pro-
vide the manufacturing facilities and labor, while foreign companies
provide technology and investment capital.' 4
These joint ventures can provide benefits to both foreign inves-
tors and host countries. For NICs such mechanisms enable PTTs to
open their enterprises to private capital markets and technologies with-
out complete privatization of the industry and without the complete
transformation of the host country's regulatory framework., 25 For for-
eign investors these arrangements may provide the most feasible
method of entering an attractive yet otherwise restricted market.'2 6
In sum, it is apparent that the international telecommunications
industry is undergoing fundamental change. Responding to the neces-
sities of modernization as well as multilateral pressures to liberalize
political policies and administrations, privatization of PTTs is becom-
ing increasingly popular as a means to attract foreign capital and
technology. Also, alternative financing and project development
mechanisms involving short-term market penetration and joint venture
partnering are gaining respect, even within the telecommunications
arena. However, one must not overlook the perspectives of develop-
ing countries and the potential advantages state control over telecom-
munication operation affords them when assessing potential methods
to finance infrastructure development. Thus, alternatives for facilitat-
ing telecommunications development must be examined in light of the
many economic perspectives and industrial factors involved therein.
IV. THE BOT PROJECT FINANCING ALTERNATIVE TO
TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT
In light of the enumerated trends within the telecommunications
industry and financial problems facing cash-strapped developing
countries, it is evident that NICs need alternatives to traditional meth-
ods of investment financing to adequately facilitate the development
of telecommunications infrastructure. It is this author's position that
concessionary project financing under the Build-Operate-Transfer
(BOT) model may provide an arrangement well suited to both the is-
sues arising with regard to telecommunications development and the
financial needs of industrializing countries.
123. Id. at 82.
124. Jad at 47.
125. Sedelnick, supra note 112.
126. See generally M. SorNARmAH, INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INvESTMENT (1994);
M. SoRNAAiJAH, LAW OF INTMRNATIONAL Jouwr VENTU S (1991) (discussing viability and
structuring of joint venture partnerships in developing countries).
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A. The Build-Operate-Transfer Model
The BOT model is a type of concessionary arrangement that is
gaining tremendous popularity in developing countries as a method of
infrastructure project financing. 27 BOT and other project financing
methods have primarily been utilized within the telecommunications,
transportation, and power generation industries.12 The BOT model
enables governments to extend privatization into the infrastructure
sector, while concurrently allowing a government to refrain from sup-
plying "inappropriate financial cover, managerial participation, or
operating and administration costs associated with large scale [infra-
structure] projects."129
In practice, private sector participants organize a special project
company and, upon securing an exclusive license from the host gov-
ernment to collect revenue (the concession agreement), construct, con-
trol, and operate a project for a determinate duration. Subsequently
the private sector participants transfer the project company assets back
to the host government.1 30 The concession from the government ex-
ists for a limited duration, usually fifteen to twenty-five years depend-
ing upon the various characteristics of a project, which is estimated at
the outset as being sufficient to pay back accrued debt and provide a
reasonable return on equity for investors.1 31 Ideally, upon transfer, the
project company will be vested with the managerial expertise and
technological capability to enable the host government to assume con-
trol and effectively operate the continuing project. 132
The primary rationale for including the transfer feature has been
to respond to political concerns over private sector ownership and
control of sensitive economic activities, such as, telecommunications,
power generation, or transportation.1 33 Like the power sector, a host
government's ongoing role in the telecommunications sector includes:
expansion planning, rural access, system management, and ensuring
127. "Major BOT projects currently under way include tunnels in Chile, roads in China,
power and roads in Malaysia, ports and roads in Mexico, power in the Philippines and telecom-
munications in Thailand." Scott Durchslag et al., The Promise ofinfrastructure Privatization, 4
MCKNSEY Q., Second Issue, 1994, at 3, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, ALLWLD File.
128. Cao, supra note 45.
129. Hensley & White, supra note 49.
130. Il
131. Id.
132. Sidley & Austin, Build/Operate/Transfer Arrangements, Singapore, at 3 (article on file
with the Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal).
133. Cao, supra note 45. Such activities have been deemed politically strategic due to
"their important role in the economy as well as their importance to the government in running the
country." let
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low-cost services on a uniform scale. 3 4 Other rationales for including
the subsequent transfer of facilities include: the innovative, untested
nature of alternative project financing methods; fears of displacing en-
trenched bureaucracy; and persevering reluctance' toward complete
privatization of previously state-controlled industry.
Under the BOT scheme, financing is obtained by the project
company, a lead investor, or a consortium of lenders composed of
commercial participants. Financing is often guaranteed by export
credit agencies and other bilateral and multilateral lending institu-
tions. 135 Such "project-specific" lending often enables developing
countries to receive more favorable credit terms than they might other-
wise be forced to accept in circumstances where political upheaval or
a history of debt default has caused lenders to view such countries as
high credit risks.136 If the project proceeds according to plan, at the
point of transfer the project will have used its cash flows to pay off
construction and project financing costs it has incurred without any
substantial dependence upon the host government's financial support.
A key attraction of the BOT model for foreign governments is
that such project financing is premised upon limited recourse financ-
ing, with project funds being raised without any ultimate guarantee of
repayment by the host government.1 37 This removal of the govern-
ment as financial sponsor places obligations wholly on the private sec-
tor. Investors and lenders supporting the project company must
instead rely on the revenues earned through project service sales to
recover their returns on equity and service project loans.138
Although in essence a type of contractual joint venture,139 project
financing based upon the BOT structure may be more suitable for for-
eign market penetration than traditional joint ventures in some circum-
stances. According to European Union legislative specifications for
example, a joint venture is "an organized assembly of human and ma-
terial resources, intended to pursue a defined economic purpose on a
134. Burr, supra note 46.
135. Hensley & White, supra note 49.
136. Atsuki Maeyama, Asia& Pacific; Turnkey Operations Get New Twist, Japanese Firms
Buil4 Finance, and Operate Facilities to Meet Asia's Infrastructure Demand. NiKKaE WKLv.,
Mar. 6, 1995, at 19, available in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library, ALLNWS File. ("Interest rates in
the usual project finance deal are 1.5-2 percentage points above the London Interbank offered
rate over a 10-year period. The spreads in BOT arrangements can double that.").
137. Hensley & White, supra note 49.
138. Beg, supra note 7.
139. Evans in Irani, supra note 56, at 100.
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long-term basis."4 ' Indeed, European Union law cites the duration of
agreements to undertake particular projects as a relevant factor in the
determination of joint venture status. 4 1 Such restrictions and customs
deter foreign investors seeking shorter term investments. Also, tradi-
tional international joint ventures often suffer from indefiniteness,
which creates additional complications in the event of business failure
or termination. 42 Events, such as, bankruptcy, merger, or nationaliza-
tion, require reevaluations of the relationships between parties and
often create conflicts as to ownership of assets or technology. Gov-
ernments, or their respective state agencies, might also be hesitant to
become involved with a foreign partner for the long term where such
partnership relationships are of an undefined nature. The BOT model,
on the other hand, affords both parties the predictability and security
of a limited duration on one hand, while maintaining most of the bene-
ficial elements of traditional joint ventures on the other.
B. BOT Infrastructure Development and the
Telecommunications Industry
Project financing based upon the BOT model offers NICs an al-
ternative method to facilitate telecommunications infrastructure
development.
1. Advantages Offered by the BOT Model
The BOT scheme as a corporate mechanism for telecommunica-
tions development may be useful due to the nature of international and
domestic telecommunications industries and the ability of the telecom-
munications sector to support itself economically. Additionally, such
projects can potentially reduce investment and development costs, fa-
cilitate technology transfer, and negotiate foreign market restrictions.
First, due to increasing competition at the global level, many
public and private telecommunications enterprises continue to seek
competitive advantages from the state.' 43 Cross-subsidization and de-
fense procurements are still relied on to finance telecommunications
technology research and development.'" Perhaps more important,
however, is the fact that private investors need assurances of the sta-
140. Commission Notice on the Concentrative and Cooperative Operations Under Council
Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 On the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings, art. 8, 1990 OJ. (C 203) 10, 11 (emphasis added).
141., John H. Riggs, Jr. & Anthony Giustini, Joint Ventures Under EEC Competition Law,
46 Bus. LAW. 851, 878 & n.116 (1991).
142. Evans in Irani, supra note 56, at 99.
143. Bell, supra note 105, at 341.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 107, 120.
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bility of host governments and the predictability of their investment
market. Such assurances and incentives can be provided by the gov-
ernment to projects structured under BOT arrangements through the
licensing procedure, national tariff legislation or contractual
concessions.
BOT projects also enable wary governments to privatize in the
short term while retaining future control. Many governments of NICs
still wish to control the operation of communications services since
the sector has such direct effects upon the lives of their citizens. 14 5
Host governments will seek to assert a role in system expansion plan-
ning, rural access, and providing low-cost, efficient services to their
citizens.' 46 Furthermore, since the effective operation of telecommu-
nications industries has historically depended upon defense procure-
ment funding and state-subsidized research and development,
immediate and unilateral privatization may create turmoil within na-
tions where public and private sectors are merged and lack clear defi-
nition. 47 BOT projects enable the partnership of both public and
private sectors, thus exposing the public sector to market-based policy
making and modernized operations. With the help of effective regula-
tory mechanisms, the BOT arrangement presents a compromise to
these competing interests.
Second, telecommunications network development and upgrade
projects have demonstrated the ability to be economically self-sup-
porting, without relying upon foreign loans for continued financial
support. For example, Turkey began upgrading its communications
infrastructure in the early 1980s, increasing the number of phone lines
per 100 persons from 3.5 in 1983 to 16 in 1992. Turkey's current
calling revenues are now sufficient to fully finance continuing net-
work development.1 4 8 This factor provides further reassurance to both
foreign investors and potential lenders of the feasibility of the limited
recourse nature of such BOT telecommunications projects.149
Third, BOT projects can reduce overall investment costs in the
event a large, multipurpose private entity can be attracted to act as a
project sponsor. It has been asserted that a private firm which acts as
both the owner and operator of a project, in addition to acting as de-
signer and builder, "has strong incentives to design the facility for
145. See generally Bell, supra note 105 (describing the ideological and nationalistic con-
cers over private control of communications).
146. See supra text accompanying note 136.
147. Cf. Bell, supra note 105, at 341.
148. Amst et al., supra note 2.
149. This factor also strongly supports the practicality of pursuing a project financing based
upon the BOO (Build-Own-Operate) model as an additional alternative. See supra part II.C.
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efficient, lower-cost operations."15 Where project structures are of
limited duration, private sponsors will naturally be motivated to pro-
vide quality services and run an efficient operation from an early stage
to recover costs and profit through consumer revenue. In acknowledg-
ment of the enormous amounts of capital required to adequately de-
velop an efficient telecommunications network, such cost cutting
considerations become highly relevant.
Most importantly, developing countries require access to private
sector technology, as well as private sector capital, to effectively de-
velop telecommunications infrastructure."' Technology transfer can
be facilitated through the BOT contract by way of an equity invest-
ment or license to the project company. On one hand, technology
owners rest assured that such technology will not be misused by a host
government and indeed may retain some control over its use if the
technology is received by the company through an equity investment.
On the other hand, private sector management and operation of the
BOT project may increase the likelihood that telecommunications
technology will be utilized to its maximum potential. Similarly, trans-
fer of technology to a BOT project may more effectively allocate tech-
nology risk during a project's higher risk initial stages to the private
sector, and away from the host government.
Some governments insist on the BOT arrangement as a condition
to foreign participation in certain business ventures. China, for exam-
ple, has an existing national policy which "prohibits foreign investors
from exclusive operation and control of infrastructure projects that
closely affect the daily lives of the Chinese people." '152 In the power
industry, the Chinese government has recently passed legislation
designating "that with the exception of build-operate-transfer (BOT)
projects, a foreign investor generally is not permitted to take more
than a 30% equity interest in a power plant."'153 The existence of simi-
lar restrictions in other industries 154 creates a strong presumption that
the telecommunication industry, due to its direct influence upon the
populace and potential for antigoverumental use, will be subjected to
similar conditions.
150. Prepared a Federal Privatization Agenda Testimony of Robert W. Poole, Jr. Presented
Before the Senate Budget Committee, FED. NEws SERvicF, Mar. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS,
WORLD Library, ALLWLD File.
151. See supra part II.
152. Lam, supra note 83.
153. lId
154. Such industries also include the construction and operation of shipping ports and
wharves. Id.
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2. Potential Disadvantages and Problems
The use of the BOT model in developing telecommunication in-
frastructure is not without its disadvantages. The untested risk alloca-
tion structure, potential conflicts of interest, issues regarding
technology transfer, and the limited liability nature of nonrecourse fi-
nancing are factors that should make potential investors cautious when
entering such project financing arrangements.
First, a distinguishable and untested risk profile arises in project
financing arrangements which is complicated by the characteristics of
any particular project.155 Completion, operation, and political risks
must be adequately understood and provided for within the contracts
that define the project.156 The completion risk comprises the risks in-
volved during the initial construction and start-up phases necessary to
bring the project into operation.157 This initial period presents the
highest risk due to potential problems, such as, cost overruns, delays
in infrastructure construction, and technical failures. 158 Operation risk
will depend on the management expertise of an operator, the compe-
tence of the work force, and the project's susceptibility to breakdown
and environmental degradation.' The primary political risk arising
under such agreement is the threat of nationalization of project facili-
ties during the concession period.160
Political risk... [also] includes the risk of civil disorder and revo-
lutions, outright expropriations without compensation or creeping
expropriations such as the imposition of taxes or royalties, the re-
moval of construction licenses or licenses for the import of project
equipment, the imposition of export prohibitions or price controls,
exchange control regulations and forced management.' 6 1
In contrast to some other BOT projects (i.e., power projects),
fixed network telecommunications projects require project operators
to sell services directly to domestic consumers to raise revenue, rather
than to the host government.' 62 This lack of guaranteed revenue cre-
ates a risk many potential investors may be hesitant to take. It also
155. Traverso, supra note 29.
156. See infra part V.C.
157. PHmui WooD, 2A LAw AND PRACTICE OF INTrERNAMONAL FINANCE § 14.01 (1990).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Project participation by certain multilateral financial institutions such as the IFC may
mitigate this risk of nationalization in the eyes of more conservative lenders. See generally Sou-
lard, supra note 23.
161. WoOD, supra note 157.
162. The Scramble for Telecoms, EuRoMoNEY TRADE FIN. AND BANKER INT'L, Mar. 23,
1995, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, ALLWLD File [hereinafter Scramble for
Telecoms].
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may remove "government commitment to currency conversion," fur-
ther exacerbating investment risk.163 Thus, lenders and equity spon-
sors require proper understanding of and protections against these
risks from the outset, tasks which require highly effective lawyering in
the form of both consultation and drafting.
Conflicts of interest may also arise in BOT telecommunications
projects. The World Bank recently cited problems in Thailand regard-
ing that country's policy of granting franchises to the public sector
through BOT contracts.' The report noted that as the public Tele-
phone Organization of Thailand (TOT)1"5 entered into new markets
through private concessionary partnering, TOT functioned simultane-
ously as an operator and regulator of telecommunications services.1 66
This duality created a conflict, "because as an operator [TOT] must
maximize revenue," yet as a regulator the agency "may seek faster
network expansion" and low cost public services. 67 Moreover, addi-
tional potential conflicts faced TOT since, upon privatization, the
agency would directly compete against its own BOT contractors while
still regulating their activities.' 68
While these issues may appear unresolvable, independent admin-
istrative control may provide an effective solution. The World Bank
recommended that Thailand create a legislative plan "which would
better define the roles of TOT ... and private sector participants" and
"separate regulatory from operational functions."' 69 This course more
closely resembles the course the United States adopted in creating the
Federal Communications Commission and granting the concession to
AT&T years ago.170
A significant issue facing private companies supplying technol-
ogy to a BOT project concerns how the reversionary transfer of tele-
communications infrastructure to the host government will occur at
the end of the concession. Some suppliers may be encouraged to sup-
ply outdated technology since the project will ultimately revert to the
host government. Also, some suppliers may be hesitant to supply
more unstable governments with access to informational and commu-
nications network infrastructure in the fear that, upon reversion to the
163. Id
164. Preaching Privatization for Thai Telecoms, E. AsmN A FFR, Jan. 4, 1995, available
in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library, ALLNWS File [hereinafter Preaching Privatization).
165. TOT controls both local and international telecommunications in Thailand. Id
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id
170. See United States v. Western Elec. Co. Inc., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246 (Jan. 24,
1956).
1996]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
government, such technology may be misused. While such concerns
are warranted, effective structuring of the BOT arrangement may
serve to alleviate many of these issues surrounding technology
transfer.1 71
Finally, the limited liability nature of project financing has been
criticized by some. Project financing has been attacked as being a
"heads I win; tails you lose" tactic which encourages investors to pur-
sue extremely risky ventures at the potential expense of the public.' 72
Due to the limited recourse nature of BOTs, "the problems of the in-
vestors are passed on to subscribers in poor line quality, a low call
connection ratio, long delays in repairing lines, relatively high com-
munications costs and poor network management that manifests itself
in inaccurate billing."'173 Indeed, it is the nature of such a project that
no ultimate agent will be subjected to ultimate liability in the event of
loan default. These risks may be mitigated, however, through govern-
ment subsidization and tax incentives, by the use of extensive price
fluctuation formulas within the contract, or through insurance.17 4
Even with such disadvantages in mind, the potential benefits of-
fered by the BOT model may outweigh any potential risks. Such
projects offer foreign investors the security of having a high-risk/high-
reward investment of a defined duration. BOTs offer the opportunity
for limiting a host government's financial and managerial responsibili-
ties in the short-term while offering the government the assurance of
future control. Finally, BOTs can facilitate the efficient establishment
of telecommunications infrastructure in countries requiring a large in-
flux of both capital and technology.
V. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF BOT ARRANGEMENTS
Due to relatively recent development of project financing meth-
ods, existing legal commentary and case precedent relating to the sub-
ject is quite scarce. For this reason, an adequate understanding of the
legal risks and contractual issues arising in the arrangement of such
projects becomes essential.
171. See infra part V.C.7.
172. Jonathan R. Macey, The Limited Liability Company: Lessons for Corporate Law, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 433, 448 (1995).
173. Shortfalls of BOT Concessions Beginning to Appear, Bus. ASIA, Sept. 13, 1993, avail-
able in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library, ALLNWS File.
174. See infra part V.C.
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A. The Legal Nature of Concessionary Agreements
A BOT structured project requires a concessionary arrangement
to be worked out between the project company and the government.
Since some of the contractual obligations imposed upon the private
party may be generated by legislation or decrees, legal anomalies arise
due to the concession agreement's constitution as both contract and
sovereign act.175
Countries based upon the common law tradition "distinguish be-
tween private and government contracts."' 176 Often, under such legal
regimes, contractual and tort remedies are afforded as protection only
for breaches that arise under private contracts.' 77 In addition, "at
common law, a private party to a government contract [generally] has
no recourse against the government if the government breaches the
contract."'
178
Civil legal systems can be differentiated between those based
upon either the French or German traditions.' 79 French civil law sys-
tem defines concession agreements according to the doctrine of "con-
trat administratif," rather than basing such agreements upon the
doctrine of "contrat prive."' 80 Thereby, French law "treats the parties
to a 'contrat adminstratif' unequally and enables the state or its [con-
tracting] instrumentality ... to amend unilaterally the provisions of
the contract."' 81 In contrast, under the German civil law system, the
granting of a concession or license is considered a unilateral adminis-
trative act and there is no distinction between private and government
contracts.'8 2 The contract serves merely "to elaborate the relationship
between the concessionaire and the government."'1 3 Thus, under the
German legal system, a concession agreement's binding power is
predicated "upon the existence of a valid administrative act."' 84
In the past, host governments have attempted to the avoid the
legally binding nature of their obligations under concession agree-
ments by relying upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity.' 8 5 How-
175. Soloveytchik, supra note 67, at 264.
176. ld.
177. Id
178. Ua A host government might permit suits, however, either explicitly within the con-
cession agreement or by law. Id.
179. Id at 265.
180. Id.
181. Id
182. Id
183. Id
184. d at 265-66.
185. Id at 266. See, e.g., Texaco Overseas Co. v. Libya, 53 I.L.R. 389, 422 (I.C.J. Arb.
1977). For more on the doctrine of foreign immunity and its application to concession agree-
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ever, institutional arbitrations and courts have almost universally
rejected sovereign immunity defenses on international legal grounds
where stabilization clauses are included within the concession agree-
ment.186 Such clauses act as a waiver of sovereign immunity and may
also subject host governments to U.S. jurisdiction in the event Ameri-
can parties are involved.' 87 Such findings magnify the need of pro-
moters to insist upon stabilization or antinationalization clauses in the
concession agreement in order to protect themselves under interna-
tional law against unilateral termination by a host government.
Some European jurisprudential thought advances the view that
concession agreements are to be considered "commercial transactions"
between the state and private industry.' 88 Under United States law,
this characterization of concession agreements would place them in
the realm of "commercial activity"' 89 under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976,190 which could result in a loss of sovereign
immunity in disputes with foreign concessionaires.
Despite the fact that international judicial institutions have up-
held the legal obligations created by concession contracts, it must be
acknowledged that such protection may not prove satisfactory. Pri-
vate companies may place too much reliance upon the contractual re-
lationship and fail to recognize the importance of maintaining an open
and honest understanding with their governmental partners. It can be
argued that such a close relationship, based upon complete under-
standing of the risks and goals of the parties, is of utmost necessity
under the BOT scheme in light of the concessionary nature of BOT
projects (i.e., private control and management of project company by
private sector during concession but ultimate assumption of control by
ments, see Georges R. Delaume, Economic Development and Sovereign Immunity, 79 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 319 (1995).
186. Soloveytchik, supra note 67, at 266, 267 n.19 (discussing effect of Texaco Overseas
Co. v. Libya supra note 185).
187. Rebecca J. Simmons, Note, Nationalized and Denationalized Commercial Enterprises
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 90 COLuM. L. REv. 2278, 2287 (1990).
188. F. A. Mann, The State Immunity Act 1978, 50 B=ar. Y.B. INT'L L. 43, 52 (1979).
189. See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992). For a
detailed description of Weltover, Inc. and an explanation of the Court's characterization of the
public debt of foreign states as "commercial activity," see Georges R. Delaume, The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act and Public Debt Litigation: Some Fifteen Years Later, 88 AM. J.
I'L. L. 257 (1994).
190. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-1611 (West Supp.
1995). The "commercial" exception of § 1605(a)(2) provides that a foreign state is not immune
from suit in cases where state commercial activity causes direct effects in the United States.
Foreign courts have also created similar exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See
Mann, supra note 188. See generally Delaume, supra note 185 (providing a more detailed expla-
nation of sovereign immunity, the commercial exception and its extension to foreign jurisdiction
and legislation).
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host government), as well as the importance of telecommunications
service to the general public. Since the project is nonrecourse, all par-
ties will have strong incentives to see that the project makes money.
But further, since such projects also involve technology transfers to
foreign state agencies, investors may have even stronger incentives to
ensure a solid relationship with its governmental partner.
B. The Regulatory Framework
Various regulatory mechanisms will affect the usage of the BOT
model for the development of telecommunications projects. National
regulation of BOT projects, the existence of bilateral and multilateral
treaties, and the national and international regulation of the telecom-
munications industry, all become relevant when assessing the advan-
tages of the use of a BOT model in developing network infrastructure.
1. National Regulative Methods
"Telecoms projects generally, and fixed network projects espe-
cially, rely on a definitive regulatory framework." '1 91 National legisla-
tive efforts by a host government will affect both the regulation of
BOT projects on the one hand, and telecommunications projects, in
particular, on the other. Regulation should provide a "clear frame-
work for the enforcement of contractual obligations," as well as, in the
interest of foreign investors, "a comprehensive and reliable mecha-
nism for ensuring that earnings in the local currency can be converted
into foreign currency and repatriated." '192 An example from Viet-
nam's BOT Regulations states:
The government shall guarantee that the revenue received by the
BOT company during this period of operation be converted from
Vietnamese currency into foreign currencies in accordance with the
contract for the purposes of repaying loan capital and interest, pay-
ing all expenditure requiring foreign currency and paying to foreign
investors their share of profits which are transferred abroad. 193
The regulation of concession agreements by the host government
may be either through independent legislation, or through ordinary
contract and administrative law. 94 Turkey, for example, recently
passed legislation to ensure effective implementation of BOT arrange-
191. Scramble for Telecoms, supra note 162.
192. Ian Arstall & David Platt, Project Finance, Ir'L FIN. L. Rev., Feb. 1995, at 27, avail-
able in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library, ALLNWS File.
193. l
194. Soloveytchik, supra note 67, at 267.
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ments. 195 The proclamation delineates the method for awarding con-
tracts to local joint stock and foreign companies that seek to provide
capital investment or services under BOT arrangements. 196 It also sets
forth the particular authorization procedure and the required character-
istics of companies seeking to participate in BOT projects, such as,
technical qualifications and investment and capitalization ratios. 197
The enactment of this legislation in Turkey removed BOT projects
from the realm of concessions, which can only be arbitrated when
claims arise in Turkish tribunals. 198 Contracting participants now
have the ability to directly appeal to international courts for the resolu-
tion of disputes arising from BOT projects.' 99
The scope of such national proposals will be specifically tailored
to a host country seeking to utilize the BOT structure. Invariably,
such legislation will depend upon each particular nation's comfort
zone with regard to foreign investment, its commitment to the BOT
model, and its faith in the ability of international bodies to effectively
handle extranational appeals.
A host government's regulation of the telecommunications indus-
try will also affect the practicality of utilizing project financing. Pri-
marily, governments must establish independent regulatory bodies,
distinct from state-controlled PTTs, to resolve inherent conflicts of in-
terest that may arise due to short-term privatization attempts.200 A
fundamental priority for such a regulatory agency would be to estab-
lish a tariff structure in accordance with principles of open competi-
tion and which ensures that telecommunications suppliers do not
exploit dominant market positions.201 On the other hand, such regula-
tion must also acknowledge the need for foreign sponsors of BOT
projects to create adequate revenue to pay off investment costs.
Alternatively, or as supplemental sources of authority, several
countries have established codes dealing specifically with the issues
that arise when concessions are granted within particular industries. 202
195. Turkish Decree No. 94/5907, concerning the Method and Principles of Application
Regarding the realization of some Investments and Services Under the Build-Operate-Transfer
Model, effective Oct. 1, 1994, reprinted in BOT Regulations, MIDDLE E. ExECutnvE REP., Nov.
1994, at 25 [hereinafter Turkish Decree in BOT Regulations), available in LEXIS, WORLD
Library, ALLNWS File.
196. Id
197. Id
198. Jim Bodgener, BOT Formula Might Save the Day, MEaD MIDDLE E. Bus WKLY., July
29, 1994.
199. Id.
200. See supra text accompanying note 165.
201. Preaching Privatization, supra note 164.
202. Soloveytchik, supra note 67, at 267.
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Such codes may set forth requirements regarding ownership of re-
sources, state participation in the operation of the project, tax regula-
tion, or bidding procedures, with particularity as to the industry in
which a concession is granted.20 3
2. Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties
With regard to issues regarding foreign investment, bilateral and
multilateral treaties between the governments often affect the resolu-
tion of conflicts that may arise within a BOT investment arrange-
ment.2 4  Such treaties typically provide that host governments
attracting foreign investments "will accord fair and equitable treat-
ment of foreign investors" and will generally "allow for the free trans-
fer of a foreign company's earnings. 20 5 Moreover, restrictions on
state expropriations and assurances of "prompt, adequate and effective
compensation" in return for governmental takings are standard provi-
sions.206 Finally, arbitration provisions which serve as dispute settle-
ment mechanisms are often included.20 7
While it is difficult to gauge the actual extent of protections of-
fered by bilateral investment treaties, they do seem to enhance the
security of overseas investments by providing investors with substan-
tive rights.208 Some commentators acknowledge that the presence of
bilateral investment treaties alone may cause host governments to
reevaluate their legislative and constitutional provisions affecting for-
eign investment.20 9 At the least, such treaties should provide investors
with interests in foreign contracts additional assurances that their over-
seas involvements will be protected against nationalization or expro-
priation by host governments.
Attempts to provide a uniform international telecommunications
regulatory framework through a multilateral treaty were made during
negotiations for the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS).21 0 The purpose in seeking to establish a structure for open
network activities is to:
promote open international markets for the provision of telecom-
munication network-based services, ensure fair and competitive
203. Id.
204. Robin, supra note 51, at 942.
205. Id.
206. Id at 942 & n.82, 952 n.139.
207. Id at 942 & n.83.
208. Id. at 943-44 & n.89.
209. Id at 944 n.90.
210. Uruguay Round, supra note 120, General Agreement on Trade in Services, Part II -
Annex IB, '1 6.
1996]
468 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12
market conditions, equal technical access to reserved facilities and
services, transparency of public network protocols and technology,
and protect suppliers of competitive facilities and services from un-
fair practices and discrimination by public telecommunication
operators.2 1'
Unfortunately, such a regulatory format is still currently under consid-
eration, 212 and potential investors must look to other regulatory bodies
to determine the feasibility of telecommunications investment into
NICs in the near future.
3. The International Telecommunication Union
For the past century, the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) has been the principal organization affecting the international
regulation of telecommunications activity. 3 The purposes of the ITU
are:
(a) to maintain and extend international cooperation for the im-
provement and rational use of telecommunications of all kinds; (b)
to promote the development of technical facilities and their most
efficient operation with a view to improving the efficiency of tele-
communications services, increasing their usefulness and making
them, so far as possible, generally available to the public; and (c) to
harmonize the actions of nations in the attainment of those ends.214
In pursuit of this goal, the ITU has instituted guidelines governing
telecommunications equipment manufacture, operations, and tariff
setting. It has served as a forum for the exchange of technical infor-
mation to be used in the construction and operation of telecommunica-
tions service.21 5 This development of international technical
standardization has enabled technicians to interconnect incompatible
operating systems into a global network.216
Although the ITU has been effective in facilitating the intercon-
nection and interoperability of the global telecommunications network
by providing standards and a forum for discussion, the organization
lacks enforcement power.
211. OECD in ST EPHAN ET AL., supra note 92, at 787.
212. See Uruguay Round, supra note 120, part III, Ministerial Decisions and Declarations,
7(d): Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications.
213. Fascell & Schlundt, supra note 23, at 496. Originally founded in 1865, the ITU was
formally reorganized in 1947. International Telecommunications Convention, Oct. 2, 1947, 63
Stat. 1399 (amended in Malaga-Torremolinos, Spain in 1973).
214. International Telecommunications Convention, supra note 213, art. 3, § 1.
215. Fascell & Schlundt, supra note 23, at 496.
216. Anne W. Branscomb, Global Governance of Global Networks: A Survey of Trans.
border Data Flow in Transition, 36 VAND. L. REv. 985, 997 (1983).
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The ITU essentially is a cooperative venture among nations that
provides a forum for negotiating agreements which facilitate the
flow of information across national borders through electronic
means ....
... Participation is completely voluntary; the organization has
no sanctions to enforce compliance and no mandate to develop op-
erational services.
217
This lack of enforcement power and limited operational authority can
create a relatively unsettling environment for foreign investors seeking
to participate in the international telecommunications industry.
As a response to these asserted problems with such traditional
approaches to telecommunications development and the regulation
thereof, the ITU is seeking to create a new organization, WorldTel, in
an attempt to attract multinational funding from private industry.218
This new organization will support project financing initiatives, such
as, build-own-operate and build-operate-transfer, by "providing direct
equity investment raised from private investors, as well as coordinat-
ing project finance from other sources. 219
4. The Federal Communications Commission
Finally, the role of the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) should not be underestimated in any discussion regarding the
regulation of international telecommunications. The FCC is granted
jurisdiction over foreign communications by radio, wire, and cable
pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934 (as amended)220 and the
International Maritime Act of 1978.221 The FCC also interacts with
PTTs through such formal settings as the ITU and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and through infor-
mal bilateral discussions and consultations, for the purposes of plan-
ning facilities and exchanging information regarding the development
and regulation of communications systems.222
217. Id at 997-98.
218. Julian Bright & Stephen McClelland, ITU Plan to Close North/South Communications
Gap, TE.Ecoamm. (International Edition), July 1995, available in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library,
ALLNWS File.
219. Id
220. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
221. Chiron & Rehberg, supra note 102, at 3 n.6. Relevant language contained within Sec-
tion 1 of the amended Communications Act of 1934 specifically authorizes the FCC to promote
"a rapid, efficient, nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service." 47
U.S.C. § 151 (1988 & Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
222. Chiron & Rehberg, supra note 102, at 7.
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In serving the public interest, the FCC controls rates, facilitates
interconnection of individual network systems, and provides approval
for the construction and operation of network facilities.223 By elimi-
nating obstacles to entry into the international communications field,
"the Commission has sought to increase the number of carriers provid-
ing service, thus providing users with additional carrier and service
options, creating a downward pressure on rates, and permitting carri-
ers to efficiently utilize new technologies."224 The FCC has displayed
an increasing willingness to extend domestic regulatory rulings to the
international level.225 One such decision was the extension of the "ba-
sic/enhanced services dichotomy," as set forth in the Second Com-
puter Inquiry,226 to the international arena.227 A final example of FCC
participation in the area of international telecommunications develop-
ment has been its "continued use of rate base regulation for carriers
with clear market power or for carriers who provide a service on a
monopoly basis." '228
These factors demonstrate the ability of the FCC to foster effec-
tive telecommunication development at the international level. Such
FCC participation may, in turn, be increasingly solicited to assist for-
eign host governments in establishing reliable rate determinations,
clear interoperability standards and reasonable regulatory provisions
in the event such governments seek to avail themselves of project fi-
nancing techniques in the area of telecommunications development.
C. Contractual Assurances
Contractual protections are of primary significance to project fi-
nance structuring due to the somewhat undefined legal status of con-
cession agreements and lack of a cohesive international regime which
might provide dependable enforcement and regulatory functions in
resolving conflicts between project participants. BOT arrangements,
223. Id at 6.
224. Id at 9.
225. Id. at 10.
226. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second
Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 386 (1980). In an attempt to address new regulatory issues
arising from the convergence of the communications and data processing industries, the FCC
differentiated between basic communication services and enhanced services. The former were
subjected to "traditional Title II regulatory requirements such as rate-of-return regulations, tarif-
fing requirements, and facilities authorization," while the latter were found to be outside the
scope of Title Iljurisdiction. Chiron & Rehberg, supra note 102, at 49-50. For an explanation
of the current status of the basicienhanced services dichotomy, see generally Robert M. Frieden,
The Third Computer Inquiry: A Deregulatory Dilemma, 38 FED. COMM. L.J. 383 (1987).
227. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second
Computer Inquiry) 84 F.C.C.2d 50, 67 (1980).
228. Chiron & Rehberg, supra note 102, at 10-11.
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like other alternative project financing methods, require detailed and
particularized contract drafting due to the complex legal relationships
between the parties and the importance of adequate risk allocation.2 29
Predictable risk allocation becomes crucial to such projects since
"sponsors raise funds secured only by the revenue and assets of the
project" without the existence of an ultimate guarantor to ensure pro-
ject completion?230
1. The Concession Agreement
The concession agreement, entered into by the applicable admin-
istrative agency of the host government and the project company, es-
tablishes the essential definition of the project's directive and provides
the license for construction and operation of the project.2 3 1 The con-
tract "should carefully define what is required of the concession oper-
ator, what precisely the operator will be permitted to do, and, most
importantly, the length of time for which the concession is
granted."' 2  In addition, this agreement may also set out the corporate
charter of the project company, with provisions regarding "equity and
shareholding structure, restrictions on foreign ownership and control,
the internal organisation and management, and the structure of the
board of directors." 3
The concession agreement may also designate a fixed rate of re-
turn.3 4 Presumably, this would be tied to consumer rates of telecom-
munications services and may assist in minimizing financial risk and
in obtaining flexibility in accessing additional capital.235 Unfortu-
nately, fixing the rate of return fails to address capital cost attribution
and may negatively affect the overall efficiency of the project or deter
lenders?3 16 In the alternative, fixed rates of return may provide project
sponsors with a windfall at the expense of the consuming public. 7
229. Traverso, supra note 29.
230. Asian Infrastructure; The Biggest Bet on Earth, FoRTUN, Oct. 31, 1994, at 139.
231. Morris Fletcher & Cross, ON SrrE, 1 MF&C CONsTRUTON NEwslTR 3, Sept.
1991, at 4-5 (article on file with the Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal).
232. Sidley & Austin, supra note 132, at 6. Such terms should also reflect terms provided
for under the Operations and Management Agreement. See infra part V.C.5.
233. Morris Fletcher & Cross, supra note 231, at 4. Such terms may, in the alternative, be
provided for in the company bylaws or within a consortium agreement. See infra parts V.C.2.a-
b.
234. This course has been insisted upon by such countries as China and India in the past.
Burr, supra note 46.
235. Morris Fletcher & Cross, supra note 231, at 7.
236. Burr, supra note 46.
237. The Chinese government has recently voiced concern over such investment returns and
is rumored to be considering capping rates of return at 12%. Louise Lucas & Simon Holberton,
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These problems may be overcome however, by implementing a com-
petitive bidding procedure with an unbiased approval process. 238
Additional issues that will arise when drafting the terms of the
concession agreement include: whether the host government is to be
compensated through royalty payments and taxation or by an equity
share in the project company; whether the company will be included
within the scope of existing price controls or mandatory local sale
specifications; and whether the company will be permitted to freely
import foreign materials and equipment supplies. 239 The concession
agreement also should establish the terms of ownership of the project.
Since telecommunications projects will require licenses, easements,
and other various leasehold interests to be provided to the project
company, the terms of such agreements must be adequately defined
and may coincide with the duration of the concession period. It may
also be necessary to include renewal provisions to facilitate future re-
structuring in the event the parties wish to extend the concession
period.
The sponsors and lenders of the company may wish to seek addi-
tional guarantees from the government to enhance the security outlay
of the project.240 The government may be required to provide protec-
tions against specified force majeure occurrences or tax reassess-
ments.241 Foreign sponsors may seek to permit indexation of
telecommunications service prices as protection against inflation or
fluctuations in the foreign exchange rate.242 Investors may want the
government to guarantee that the convertibility of local currency and
remitability of foreign exchange extends to imported capital, debt
services dividends, and capital repatriation.243 The investors may also
insist that the government provide foreign exchange insurance to en-
able the project company to predict the actual cost of foreign debt
service commitments.244
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the concession agreement
must enable the project company "to freely exploit the project with
Fear of China Cap on Power Profits - Rumours of Investment Return Limits, FIN. TIMES, May
13, 1994, at 6, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ALLNWS File.
238. I
239. Wood, supra note 157, § 14.05[2].
240. Such provisions may be consolidated into the Project Financing agreement or other-
wise included within the Concession agreement.
241. Beg, supra note 7.
242. Id
243. Id
244. Id Other available incentives that a host government may use are: tax holidays,
waived duties on imported machinery or technology, or tariff calculations to provide attractive
return on investment. Id
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minimum government interference."245 Due to the many factors
which are contributing to increasing privatizations in the telecommu-
nications industry,"4 as well as the inherent nature of the BOT financ-
ing structure, governmental participation should be limited, at least in
the early stages of the project.247 The project sponsors will most defi-
nitely seek a stabilization clause ensuring against the nationalization
of the project prior to its natural termination.24 Such a stabilization
provision should clearly define the activities that will constitute a "na-
tionalization" by the government. 249 Government guarantees against
nationalization or expropriation should reflect the duration of the pro-
ject and may take the form of liquidated damages. 5"
2. The Project Company Structure
A BOT project financing will require the host government and
project sponsor or sponsors to determine an appropriate corporate
structure for the concession or "project" company.251 When choosing
an appropriate corporate structure and determining the manner of eq-
uity contribution to the project company, sponsors should be mindful
of the three general categories of risk which need to be allocated by
contract in a typical project financing: design engineering and con-
struction risks, start-up risks, and operating risks.5 2
a. The Consortium Agreement
Depending upon the existence of large corporate partners capable
of sponsoring such a telecommunications network project wholly on
its own, the project company may be controlled by a consortium, com-
245. Morris Fletcher & Cross, supra note 231, at 4. See infra part V.C.5.
246. See supra part nI (discussing problems facing state control of and technological factors
contributing to privatization of telecommunications industries).
247. Restrictions on governmental control over the project may also protect the state from
project liabilities.
248. As stated earlier, the lack of a stabilization clause in a concessionary agreement may
be cause enough, under international law, for a foreign government to escape its obligations on
the basis of sovereign immunity. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
249. In Thailand, a recent highway project financing was disassembled when the parties
failed to agree as to whether the Thai government's forcing open of a toll road, prior to complete
party agreement as to revenue-sharing and other matters, constituted a "nationalization' of the
project. Paul A. Sherer, Mass-Transit Mystery: Bangkok Begins Building As-Yet Unfunded Rail-
way, ASIAN WALL ST. J. WrViu., May 1, 1995, at 1, 11.
250. Since the project company is depending upon a 20 to 30-year concession period in
which to recover its costs and repay its lenders, early termination would call for increased dam-
ages liability in the event of such a breach. In addition, quantifying liquidated damages in such
projects may result in extensive negotiations between parties since valuation of telecommunica-
tions technology contributions may be complicated and somewhat indefinite.
251. Morris Fletcher & Cross, supra note 231, at 5.
252. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 195.
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prised of "construction companies, consultants, financiers and equip-
ment suppliers." 3 The host government may also wish to participate
in the project company through an equity position,254 especially since
telecommunications service provision remains a viable component to
the political policies of many NIC governments.
In the event such a consortium of players exists, a consortium
agreement will be necessary to regulate the relationship between the
members and to define the day-to-day management of the company.2 55
The contract should clarify funding responsibilities" 6 and levels of
party shareholding, as well as any restrictions on share transfer.257
The parties to the project may also wish to include a detailed liquida-
tion procedure for protection against project failure prior to transfer to
the host government. Further, charter documents "should address is-
sues such as share capital, directors, requirements regarding loan fi-
nance, appointment of [financial and legal advisors], access to
accounting records, confidentiality, dividend policy, share transfers,
debt servicing, governing law, service of process, and resolution of
disputes.""2  While an adequate explanation of loan syndications and
consortiums is beyond the scope of this article, the practitioner should
be wary of the many issues arising under such financing arrangements
in the event such cooperative lending mechanisms are utilized.259
b. The Project Company
Primary factors to be considered when determining an ownership
structure for the project company will include: the potential "need for
a relatively high proportion of equity to debt;" the concern regarding
project management; the taxation and credit impact; and the transfera-
bility of interests in the project company.260 The sponsor or sponsors
of the project may either establish a joint venture arrangement or cre-
ate in the jurisdiction of the project a separate business entity in which
253. Morris Fletcher & Cross, supra note 231, at 5.
254. Id
255. Id.
256. Such funding responsibilities would take the form of equity injections to the sponsor
company. Id.
257. The determination of shareholding levels will be dependent upon the stage of the pro-
ject financing. Id. For example, "if the contractor responsible for construction is a member of
the consortium, it should be a requirement that its shareholding be maintained at a specific per-
centage for at least the duration of the construction phase of the project." Id.
258. Id. at 6.
259. For a comprehensive discussion of the syndication of loans in financing public and
private entities at the international level, see Brian W. Semkow, Syndicating and Rescheduling
International Financial Transactions: A Survey of the Legal Issues Encountered by Commercial
Banks, 18 IrNr'L. LAW. 869 (1984); see also WooD, supra note 157, § 11.
260. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 189.
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the sponsors hold shares. 261 The corporate law of the project's juris-
diction will need to be examined in order to determine the feasibility
of each particular corporate arrangement for the BOT financing. 262
(i) Parent/Subsidiary
Assuming the existence of only one large project sponsor, a sin-
gle purpose corporate subsidiary may be utilized for the project fi-
nancing.263 Under such an arrangement, the project sponsor typically
incorporates a wholly-owned entity "solely to develop, construct, own,
operate, and maintain a particular project at a specific site."2" The
subsidiary, however, may lack sufficient capital and credit rating to
support the financial risks associated with the underlying loan obliga-
tion and be required to arrange some form of credit enhancement to
justify the project.2 65 This may take the form of a guarantee supplied
by the parent/project sponsor to assume the obligations of the subsidi-
266ary/project owner.
While such an organization enables the corporate parent a great
deal of control over the project, some disadvantages may exist under
such a framework. First, a parent/subsidiary relationship may create
problems when the duration of the project ends and the company is
transferred to the government. For example, there could be unfore-
seen tax repercussions or questions as to dividend disbursements to
the corporate parent prior to transfer. Second, the nonrecourse nature
of the project financing can be threatened by claims to "pierce the
corporate veil. 267 Third, project sponsors may be unwilling to pro-
vide guarantees to cover project obligations in what otherwise would
be a limited liability investment.
261. Wood, supra note 157, § 14.02[l]. In the event that a consortium of players is in-
volved and a consortium agreement exists which designates control and definition of the project
company, corporate organization may be duplicative. Regardless of which contractual method is
used, major issues such as conditions precedent to equity injection, share capital, directors, divi-
dend policy, share transfers and debt servicing should be addressed.
262. Such laws may, for example, set forth financial, technical or business requirements of
shareholders, mandatory capitalization ratios or required statements of purpose. See, e.g., Turk-
ish Decree in BOT Regulations, supra note 195.
263. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 189.
264. Id
265. Id at 208.
266. Id
267. Such a determination to "pierce the corporate veil" would require a showing that the
project is merely an "instrumentality" of the project sponsor. See Lowendahl v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 287 N.Y.S. 62 (App. Div. 1936), aff'd, 6 N.E.2d 56 (1936). For a more in depth discus-
sion of the application of this equitable remedy in the area of project financing, see Hoffman,
supra note 75, at 189-90 & n.19.
1996]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
Also, some countries simply do not allow complete foreign own-
ership of corporate entities 268 or otherwise restrict alien ownership of
certain common carrier facilities.269 In addition, due to the histori-
cally highly-regulated nature of the telecommunications industry, the
host government may seek to retain some control over the company
during the concession operation.27 This may be hampered by the
omission of the state as an equity participant and perhaps could be
more effectively enabled through a partnership or joint venture
arrangement.
(ii) General Partnership
A general partnership structure for a project financing is typically
utilized when "the project sponsor has inadequate equity, all partners
have similar tax positions, or all partners desire participation in project
management and control." 271 Such an arrangement may be insisted
upon by a host government that is strongly concerned about the pro-
tection of the public interest.272
In BOT project financing, as distinguished from other forms of
project finance, these factors may not exist. The sponsor selected by a
host government for such projects would most likely possess sufficient
equity for the initial start-up.2 73 In the area of telecommunications,
this requirement would be essential due to the large-scale initial capi-
tal costs involved in network development. Also, in the event the host
government is slated to be an active participant in the project, state
participation in management and control should remain somewhat
limited, at least in the initial stages of the project, to provide the pri-
vate sponsor with freedom to arrange financing and to ensure
favorable credit enhancement.274 Further, host governments may be
reluctant to enter project financing organized as general partnerships
because of unwillingness "to assume associated joint and several lia-
bility resulting from any negligent operation of the project."2 75
268. See supra text accompanying note 154. See also Lam, supra note 83.
269. See e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 310(a), 310(b) (1988 & Supp.
1993).
270. By participating in certain aspects of project management and control during the con-
cession period, the host government will also be afforded the opportunity to learn how to operate
the network by gaining an understanding of the underlying telecommunications technology.
271. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 190.
272. Hurstel & Carpenter-Pecquet, supra note 44.
273. Indeed, under typical BOT project financings, the project sponsor will be required to
tender a substantial equity contribution in order to demonstrate the sponsor's commitment to
ongoing participation in the project. Morris Fletcher & Cross, supra note 231, at 8.
274. See id. See also supra text accompanying notes 245-50 and 294.
275. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 190.
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(iii) Limited Partnership
A limited partnership structure may also be considered. Under
such an organization, "each limited partner shares in the project profits
while enjoying the associated limitation of liability of a limited part-
ner."276 This structure can facilitate equity contributions by passive
project investors, such as, contractors and equipment suppliers.2 77
Such contributions can supplement project financing and ensure that
construction and equipment goals are achieved. 7 Once the project
enters the operational stage and returns become quantifiable, limited
partnership interests can be purchased by the project sponsor or host
government, or otherwise transferred to protect operational
integrity.279
The limited partnership structure also enables a dominant sponsor
of the project to implement the project's development as a general
partner without extensive controls being compromised. This factor
may be prove effective for telecommunications infrastructure develop-
ment projects due to the complications associated with network inter-
connection and interoperability standardization. Such a structure may
also afford the host government an opportunity to retain an ownership
interest in the project without adversely affecting the project's ability
to obtain additional sources of financing in the future.28 0
(iv) Joint Venture
Many sponsors of project financings choose to organize the pro-
ject company as a joint venture, perhaps according to the general defi-
nitions provided above or otherwise requiring contributions of equity
with corresponding shareholding proportions. Joint ventures are often
utilized for a project financing by sponsors seeking to cooperate with
other enterprises in order to pool financial, technological, and manage-
ment resources. 281 Such entities will usually be local parties or a host
government. Additional attractions offered by the joint venture vehi-
cle include "spreading risks, efficient allocation of tax benefits, and
avoidance of restrictive covenants in loan or other agreements. 282
276. ItL at 191. For a detailed description of potential advantages and disadvantages of
limited partnership arrangements, see Gordon B. Shneider, A Historical View of Limited Partner-
ship Roll-Ups: Causes, Abuses, and Protective Strategies, 72 DaN U. L. REv. 403 (1995).
277. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 191.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 81, 138.
281. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 191.
282. Id.
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Under a joint venture BOT arrangement, a foreign investor
should be licensed to not only construct and operate the project facility
but to also exploit the underlying real estate required for construction
and operation of the project facility.28 3 Thus, the local party or host
government becomes "responsible for providing land-use, construc-
tion, and operation rights and the foreign partner is responsible for
coordinating the design, construction, and funding of the facility. '284
For the duration of the concession period, the joint venture company
will hold the exclusive right to operate the network facility and collect
service charges.285 Subsequently, at the concession's termination, all
rights and assets of the company, including the facility itself, are trans-
ferred to the local project partner at little or no cost.286
Unfortunately, host governments may require local incorporation
of the project company in an attempt to exercise greater control over
the project and simplify taxation.287 Sponsoring companies may also
prefer to incorporate locally in order to facilitate the contribution of
project assets, defer attribution of project liabilities into parent ac-
counts, isolate economic and financial risks, access local tax incen-
tives, or enable subsequent project participation by additional
parties.288
(v) Limited Liability Company
The modem limited liability company289 may be the most effec-
tive corporate structure that can be utilized under a BOT project fi-
nancing.290 Due to the fairly recent development of the limited
liability company, such a model may be used "where tax or other con-
siderations are more significant than a relative lack of certainty re-
283. Lam, supra note 83.
284. lId
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. WOOD, supra note 157, § 14.02[1l.
288. Id
289. The author's use of the term "limited liability company" is in reference to the recently
developed American investment form rather than the British limited liability structure. It is in-
tended to connote an organizational model that affords limited liability to equity investors while
avoiding the resulting double taxation of incorporation.
290. For example, the use of limited liability companies for project financing telecommuni-
cations projects was specifically authorized by statute in Indonesia in 1993. See Project and
Structured Finance Adviser - Indonesia, AsiAMoNEY, Oct. 1994, available in LEXIS, BUSFIN
Library, ALLNWS File. Such a model was also recently utilized in China to develop and oper-
ate telecommunications systems facilities. See Largo Group Ltd. Announces Pending Sale of
Telecommunications in China, Business Wire, Mar. 23, 1995.
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garding the vehicle's status under [various jurisdictional] bankruptcy
or [corporate] laws." '2 91
Sponsors typically organize limited liability companies "to create
an entity that offers investors the protections of limited liability and
the flow-through tax status of partnerships."2 92 In contrast to limited
partnership arrangements, these companies do not require the exist-
ence of a general partner who is exposed to unlimited personal liabil-
ity.293 This factor could prove attractive in the event that neither a
host government nor foreign sponsor wish to assume general partner
liability for the project. Also, limited liability companies enable in-
vestors and member participants to exercise greater control over man-
agement than other limited liability organizations.2 94 This may be
attractive to host governments who wish to participate in a BOT pro-
ject with limited liability status but still maintain supervisorial power
over the provision of telecommunications services.
One potential problem with utilizing the limited liability com-
pany structure for a BOT project is the resulting increase in borrowing
costs that can result from the limited liability nature of the com-
pany.295 Unfortunately, this factor directly contradicts many of the
economic purposes of a BOT project financing. Such borrowing
problems may be rectified however by having project sponsors or de-
velopment banks provide guarantees to hesitant lenders.2 96 Other crit-
icisms of the use of limited liability companies reflect many of the
same arguments of social responsibility directed at most project
financings. Critics allege that "when members of a limited liability
company evaluate possible investment options, they are likely only to
consider the marginal costs and benefits associated with the invest-
ments that they will be required to internalize.''2 97 The result is such
that the members profit from risky or dangerous projects that turn out
well, while costs arising from unsuccessful projects are absorbed by
creditors, tort victims, and consumers.298 While such criticisms may
indeed be justified, these disadvantages may be ultimately outweighed
291. Structured Financing Techniques, 50 Bus. LAW. 527 n.136 (1995). For a detailed
description of the structuring of limited liability companies, see MARK A. SARGENT & WALTER
D. SCHWIDENTZKY, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HANDBOOK (1995-1996).
292. Macey, supra note 172, at 434.
293. Id at 435.
294. Id. at 437. And see Sandra K. Miller, What Remedies Should Be Made Available to the
Dissatisfied Participant in a Limited Liability Company?, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 465, 469 n.9
(1994).
295. Macey, supra note 172, at 437.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
298. Id.
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by NIC's overwhelming need to establish and upgrade telecommuni-
cations infrastructure in otherwise unfavorable financial
circumstances.
3. The Project Financing and Loan Agreements
Funding for a project financing can be accessed from a variety of
sources and is usually provided through a combination of debt and
equity.299 Like other private sector projects, financial goals include
cost-effective financing, minimizing risks through utilization of hedg-
ing techniques, and ensuring finance in the long term.300
Project financing agreements enable the nonrecourse financing
nature of the arrangement by shifting risks that would normally be
assumed by the company to the government. 30 A standard nonre-
course project finance provision limits available recourse against a
project company, for liability in connection with any contractual
breach or tort claim, to the assets of the project, and removes liability
against any project sponsor or its affiliates. 30 2 Recourse against the
project sponsor is limited to claims arising from fraudulent representa-
tions or warranties occurring in connection with project financing ne-
gotiations.3"3 Two examples are included below: the first would be
for use in a loan agreement signed by the project sponsor and the
actual project owner (i.e., the government), the latter would be in-
eluded in project finance documents other than loan documents.314
The [Project Sponsor] shall not be personally liable for payment of
the amounts evidenced by the Note executed by the Borrower.
Nothing contained herein, however, shall (i) preclude the Lender or
any holder of the Notes from exercising any right or enforcing any
remedy under this Agreement, or the Note, whether upon an Event
of Default or otherwise, under this Agreement, the Note, or any
other collateral hereunder or furnished as security for any of the
indebtedness evidenced by the Note, or (ii) limit the [Project Spon-
sor's] liability hereunder in respect of any damages suffered by the
Lender as a result of any inaccuracy of any representation in this
Agreement or as a result of any fraudulent conduct on the part of
the [Project Sponsor].
Any claim against the Owner [actual project owner] that may
arise under this Agreement shall be made only against, and shall be
299. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 191.
300. Morris Fletcher & Cross, supra note 231, at 7.
301. Beg, supra note 7.
302. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 185.
303. Id. n.10.
304. Id
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limited to the assets of, the Owner, and no judgment, order or exe-
cution entered in any suit, action or proceeding thereon shall be
obtained or enforced against any partner of the Owner or the assets
of such partner or any incorporator, shareholder, officer or director
of the Owner or such partner or against any direct or indirect parent
corporation of affiliate or any incorporator, shareholder, officer or
director of any thereof for any purpose of obtaining satisfaction of
any payment of any amount arising or owing under this
Agreement.305
A sponsor company should seek to "maximise the proportion of
finance at fixed rates to minimise risks, and obtain maximum flexibil-
ity as to borrowing instruments and access to borrowing markets over
the term of financing" in order to ensure effective private control.
30 6
Practically speaking, the government may also have to arrange to fi-
nance a proportion of project cost over-runs, 307 perhaps through the
usage of revenue bonds 3 8 or more traditional governmental borrow-
ing schemes.
The nonrecourse nature of the project financing debt may also
affect the introduction of telecommunications technology to the pro-
ject. Nonrecourse liability need not extend throughout the entire con-
cession period and the financing may be structured to enable full
recourse liability to exist against a sponsor for a limited or defined
period of the project development.30 9 If new technologies are to be
used in a project, the project sponsor's full recourse liability could be
limited to the construction phase.310 Subsequently, if the technology
passes minimum performance tests, 311 lenders could then release the
project sponsor from recourse liability and shift securitization solely to
the assets of the project.312
Loan agreements are also complex because project financing re-
quires different risk assessments than are usually required in tradi-
tional forms of term lending. "Project loans involve a degree of equity
risk in the sense that they rely on the project for their pay out and not
305. IL
306. Morris Fletcher & Cross, supra note 231, at 7.
307. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 198.
308. Robbins, supra note 8, at 623. Revenue bonds, which are repaid from project reve-
nues, are more closely aligned with the general purposes of BOT project financing and further
enable minimal governmental participation. In the event such bonds are utilized, a priority pay-
ment scheme may need to be determined by the parties involved.
309. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 185-86.
310. Ua
311. Such minimum performance requirements could be determined in accordance with
ITU interoperability and interconnection standards. See supra text accompanying notes 216-19.
312. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 186.
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on the general credit of the borrower. '313 In addition to standard
clauses, they will specify "special covenants, liquidating damages,
events of default and reference to secured offshore accounts all geared
to channeling the appropriate cash flows toward timely loan repay-
ment and investment recovery" 314 and which, in turn, should be predi-
cated on the duration of the project. Although the existence of highly-
capable, well-capitalized private sponsors may affect the predictability
of a project and, subsequently, its ensuing credit terms, loan provi-
sions will primarily be reflective of the merits of any particular project
and its chances for success.
4. The Construction Agreement
With regard to the actual construction of infrastructure, certain
risks are usually allocated within a construction agreement, which too
will be a particularized agreement due to the nature of project
financing.
Network construction costs should be delineated through a lump-
sum turnkey contract, which enables "a substantial portion of the pro-
ject cost [to] be fixed or hedged. 315 Under the usual "turnkey" ar-
rangement, "a private company contracts with the [relevant]
government agency to provide the financing, design, and construction
of [a] facility" and subsequently leases the completed project back to
the contracting government agency.316 A BOT project financing, on
the other hand, will require the project company to operate the facility
for a determinate duration prior to subsequent transfer back to the gov-
ernment. In addition, the facility and all its assets will be wholly
transferred to the host government at the end of the concession, rather
than leased back to the government.
The construction risk at issue in a project financing primarily en-
tails two distinguishable uncertainties: completion and cost over-
runs.3 17 Completion delays can be dealt with by including liquidated
damages provisions in the construction agreement, while assurances of
final completion may be secured by performance bonds supplied by
the project company.318 A performance-bond provision should repre-
sent the monetary amount that would adequately compensate the host
313. WooD, supra note 157, § 14.01.
314. Traverso, supra note 29.
315. Ernst & Pham, supra note 25.
316. Robbins, supra note 8, at 624. For a detailed description of turnkey construction ar-
rangements, see Barry Joseph Miller, Note: The Architect in the Design-Build Model: Designing
and Building the Case for Strict Liability in Tort, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 116, 125-29 (1982).
317. Ernst & Pham, supra note 25.
318. Sidley & Austin, supra note 132, at 10.
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government in the event of bankruptcy, default, labor strikes or acqui-
sitions affecting the project company.31 9 Cost overruns are usually
dealt with by negotiating a "fixed-price turnkey contract" with appro-
priate liquidated damages payments reflective of the amounts of any
additional financing costs which may result from such overruns.
320
In the case of BOT projects developing telecommunications in-
frastructure, some of these may not be satisfactory solutions. Per-
formance bonds requirements and liquidated damages protections
impose additional costs to the project, which may be passed on to
consumers through higher rates. Also, since the project sponsor will
probably also be the entity constructing the information network, fixed
price turnkey contracts may not be feasible. As alternatives, contrac-
tual provisions can instead provide for the infusion of additional eq-
uity in the event of cost overruns by the project sponsor, other equity
participants, or standby equity participants. 321 The contract may pro-
vide for additional standby funding agreements, such as, subordinated
debt, standby letters of credit, or the establishment of an escrow fund
to further protect against cost overruns. 322 These alternatives could
prevent performance bond and penalty costs from being passed on to
telecommunications consumers during the operations stage of the
BOT contract.
Finally, it may be in the project sponsor's interest to seek protec-
tions against uncontrollable or force majeure risks. This could be
done through either insurance or through obtaining additional assur-
ances from the government in the form of indemnification. 32 Other
construction risks that should be considered include price: changes
caused by currency fluctuations or inflation, material shortages, design
changes required by law, and labor disputes. 324
5. The Operations and Management Agreement
Although project investors will ordinarily appropriate perform-
ance and technology risks after completion of infrastructure construc-
tion, these risks are initially covered through warranties by the turnkey
contractor and/or equipment supplier.32 Upon termination of such
319. Robbins, supra note 8, at 647.
320. Ernst & Pham, supra note 25.
321. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 200-201.
322. Id. at 198, 204-205.
323. See infra part V.C.5-6.
324. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 198-203.
325. Ernst & Pham, supra note 25. Again, the untested nature of BOT contracting in the
field of telecommunications becomes relevant. Since telecommunications networks have been
both constructed and operated by entities such as AT&T in the past, contractual relationships and
risk assessments may change dependent upon the abilities of project sponsors.
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warranties, the risks of telecommunications technologies performing
up to standard are assumed by the network operator and are mitigated
through an operations and management (O&M) agreement.326
This agreement will govern the parties upon completion of con-
struction or upgrade of the network infrastructure. 3 7 In addition to
receiving fixed operations/management fees from the pool of incom-
ing revenues, the operator (an established project company, project
sponsor, or contractor) may be remunerated through incentive pay-
ments designed to encourage superior levels of performance. 328 In the
alternative, liquidated damages payments may be due if performance
lags due to negligence or deficient maintenance. 329
Since efficient operation of the telecommunications facility will
be an indispensable element to the long-term profitability of the pro-
ject, the operator must be endowed with the requisite experience "to
operate the project at the levels necessary to generate cash flow at
projected levels." 330 In the event that this operator is a party distinct
from the project company, it should also have the financial capability
to provide operating guarantees or other assurances of completion
under the agreement.33' In addition, the operator should be enabled to
operate the facility with minimal governmental interference in order to
assure effective private sector control and protect against potential
political influences.332
Despite these goals, the host government may still seek to retain
some control over the project to ensure efficient operation of the tele-
communications facilities. For further assurance of effective opera-
tion, the government, or lending banks, may wish to provide for the
assignability of an operator's obligations and rights by the government
within the contract.33 3 This would enable the removal of ineffective
operators in the event of certain predetermined contingencies (i.e., in-
adequate revenue, failing technology, poor service quality). Indeed,
326. Id In the event that the operator of the facility is a party other than the project sponsor
or project company, this agreement would be differentiated into an Operating Agreement and a
Management Agreement. Under this scenario, a contracting party operates the facility while the
project sponsor manages day-to-day decisions in areas other than actual project operation.
327. Id
328. Id
329. Id
330. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 201.
331. Id
332. See supra parts IV.B.2, V.A. One way this may be enabled through the contract is by
allowing free assignability of operations obligations by the operator. In the event the govern-
ment seeks to assert some control over the project on the other hand, governmental notice and
consent to assignment may be insisted upon. Robbins, supra note 8, at 679.
333. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 214-15.
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due to the importance of contract performance to a project's ability to
generate predictable cash flow,334 conditional assignment of signifi-
cant contracts to either project lenders or the host government will be
crucial.
Another relevant issue that should be provided for within the
O&M contract is party indemnification. The contracting agency of the
host government should be protected against all liabilities and claims
resulting from the project company's operation of the project.335
These contract provisions might also distinguish between claims, such
as, third party personal injury and property damage, intellectual prop-
erty infringement, and failures to comply with laws.3 36
The government's primary concern with regard to the O&M
agreement will be the protection of the public interest.337 Again, such
public interest concerns encompass ensuring the continuity of service,
controlling costs, the adequacy of service, and equality to all users.338
Private investors wary of potentially adverse domestic court rulings
intended to protect such public concerns may insist upon neutral arbi-
tration in the event of disputes arising due to the operation of the net-
work facility.3 39 Finally, the government may require the project
company to reimburse costs associated with enforcing contract rights
or get consent from the contracting government agency prior to any
settlements or dispositions of claims against the project. 340
6. Insurance
Effective allocation of risk through insurance will be critical due
to both the limited recourse nature of BOT projects as well as the
untested nature of such corporate models. Contracting parties should
specify any and all potential liabilities that may arise from facility
operation and construction, including property damage and personal
334. kl at 211.
335. For an example of a model indemnification provision in a project financing operation
contract, see Robbins, supra note 8, at 660.
336. Il at 661-62. When considering the use of intellectual property infringement or in-
fringement indemnification provisions, a practitioner should reference Uruguay Round, supra
note 120, Part 11, Annex IC, Part II §§ 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 (for standards relating to the availability,
scope and use of various related intellectual property rights between member states).
337. See Hurstel & Carpenter-Pecquet, supra note 44.
338. Il
339. See generally Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States, submitted to governments, Mar. 18, 1965, 21 U.S.T. 2517,
T.I.A.S. 6997 (setting forth scope of jurisdiction and authority for the adjudication of investment
disputes through arbitration before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes).
340. See Robbins, supra note 8, at 661.
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injuries resulting from force majeure causes.341 Force majeure insur-
ance may also be available to protect against unforeseen delays in pro-
ject completion and other construction liabilities.342 Systems
performance insurance can be utilized to cover risks that telecommu-
nications technology or equipment will fail to perform at projected
levels. 343 Additionally, comprehensive general liability insurance,
worker's compensation and employer's liability insurance should be
sought to cover both construction and operation phase risks. 34
One method American investors may utilize to protect against
such risks would be to seek assistance from the Overseas Private In-
vestment Corporation (OPIC). Established in 1969, OPIC's man-
date is to facilitate the participation of American private enterprises in
the economic development of NICs.3 46 To carry out this purpose,
OPIC is authorized to insure "new investments against inconvertibility
of earnings, loss of investment due to expropriation, nationalization,
or confiscation, and loss due to war, revolution, insurrection, or civil
strife."3 47 Due to the existence of many of such risks in BOT projects,
OPIC may provide particularly effective guarantees to American in-
vestors seeking to participate in BOT arrangements abroad. 48
7. Technology Transfer
Finally, the parties may wish to define the manner of technology
transfer to the project company under some contractual arrangement.
In the area of telecommunications, such technology transfer will be
highly relevant to the nature of negotiations between the parties and
also should be considered when determining the ownership structure
of the project.
In the event telecommunications technology is supplied to the
project company by way of equity injection, proper valuation of the
technology will be crucial since the nonrecourse nature of project fi-
nancing debt mandates efficient accounting of project assets. Legisla-
341. Id at 665.
342. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 209 n.56. In this case, a relevant insurance provision
should be included within the Construction Agreement, rather than otherwise included within the
O&M Agreement.
343. Id n.7.
344. Id
345. Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-175 (1969) (codified as amended at 22
U.S.C. §§ 2191-2200b (1988 & Supp. 1993).
346. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-390
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2220b (1988 & Supp. 1993)).
347. Robin, supra note 51, at 937 (citations omitted).
348. Edward Luce, Manila Signs Joint Venture Deal for City Toll Road, FIN. TIMES 3, Aug.
31, 1995, at 3.
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tion may also set forth mandatory debt-to-equity ratio requirements.349
Parties should also consider the subsequent status of intellectual prop-
erty interests created by technology upgrade or through other joint ef-
forts from within the company.
If the technology owner is not a direct participant in the project
financing, he may be required to enter into an exclusive license agree-
ment with the project sponsor, contracting operator, or with the project
company itself.350 Such a licensing arrangement may be exclusive to
field of use or may be contingent upon the construction of the network
facility.351 If a contracting operator is the party to the license agree-
ment, project participants may also insist that the technology owner
enter into a technology supply agreement with the project sponsor in
order to secure continuing accessibility to the technology in the event
of default by a project operator.3 52 Finally, in the event new technol-
ogy is used, a guarantee of technological performance may be re-
quested from the participant owning or licensing the technology to
assure repayment of project debt.353
CONCLUSION
The Build-Operate-Transfer project financing model may indeed
prove to be an effective mechanism in bringing telecommunications
infrastructure to NICs who are hesitant to unilaterally privatize their
telecommunications industries. The scheme allows host governments
to tap private sector capital and technology, erstwhile being assured of
future control over the industry. Furthermore, in recognition of the
economic factors deterring the administrations of NICs from utilizing
public sector debt financing, dependence upon international funding
institutions is growing less and less popular. Such institutional fund-
ing is being used more often to supplement otherwise effectively capi-
talized projects. In light of such global and economic trends, project
financing is gaining more respect as a method developing countries
can utilize to attract sources of capital and technology necessary to
facilitate the establishment of a viable telecommunications network
infrastructure. With a proper understanding of the legal and economic
risks that may arise when utilizing such arrangements, project finance
349. See supra text accompanying note 198.
350. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 195-96 n.30.
351. For an example of such a technology licensing arrangement in a BOO project financ-
ing, see Cao supra note 45 (involving license of catalytic extraction processing technology by
American company to a Mexican hazardous waste facility).
352. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 195-96 n.30.
353. Id. at 200.
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can serve as a vehicle which creates a "win-win" situation for all
parties.
